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PREFACE
Work on this study began in mid-2011 with an intention to release this report late 
in 2011 or early in 2012. Clearly this did not happen. The initial cause for delay was 
personal. Later, it seemed pointless to publish before the outcome of the 2013 election 
was known because the longer term perspective that this paper seeks to take almost 
certainly would have been swept into the controversy surrounding asylum seekers.
The 2013 election is now well past and the Government has changed. The Abbott 
Government’s asylum seeker policy, although still contentious, has seen new boat 
arrivals reduce to a trickle. New surveillance systems are being acquired and major 
changes to Australia’s border protection arrangements have been announced. 
This study was completed in the months following the disappearance of Malaysian 
Airlines flight MH370 in March 2014. For reasons unknown this routine flight from 
Kuala Lumpur to Beijing seems to have turned around, headed west across the 
Malay Peninsula then south and finally disappeared into the wastes of the Indian 
Ocean, probably some 1500km west of Perth. The subsequent search for any 
evidence of the missing aircraft was coordinated initially by the Australian Maritime 
Safety Authority (AMSA) and later by a Joint Coordination Centre headed by Air 
Chief Marshal (Retired) Angus Houston AC. The initial surface search involved 
satellites, aircraft and ships (both military and civil) including from Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States. The enormous 
interest generated by the disappearance of the aircraft with 239 souls on board 
has shone a spotlight on the importance of maritime domain awareness and of 
Australia’s particular and unique circumstances. The search for MH370 bears 
eloquent testimony to the vital importance of integration and collaboration in any 
modern and mature maritime domain awareness system.
In May 2014, the Government announced major changes to the organisational 
arrangements of agencies and departments which are responsible for Australia’s 
civil maritime domain awareness system. From 1 July 2015, the border protection 
responsibilities presently performed by the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (DIBP) and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) 
will be merged into a single Department of Immigration and Border Protection. A 
single frontline operational border agency, the Australian Border Force, will also be 
created to enforce customs and immigration laws and protect the border as part 
of the DIBP. This follows trends in other nations, including the United States and 
the United Kingdom and is enabled, in no small measure, by data integration from 
diverse sources that permits connections to be made between people and activities, 
intent and capabilities in a systematic and routine way. When linked to the broader 
interests of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the national intelligence community 
and civil agencies, notably the Bureau of meteorology and Geoscience Australia 
there now exists a platform to provide decision makers comprehensive awareness 
about the state of Australia’s maritime domains and the activities that occur in them. 
This study aims to provide policy makers, practitioners and the wider public with 
background, language and context that is essential for an informed understanding 
of the challenges and dilemmas faced by those responsible for the efficacy of 
Australia’s maritime domain awareness system.
Brett Biddington 
Canberra 
November 2014
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Australia has vital interests in a safe and secure maritime environment. Almost all of 
Australia’s exports (99+% by volume and more than 75% by value) that define the 
wealth of the Australian economy travel to their destinations by ships. Yet community 
understanding of the nation’s dependence on the seas and oceans is limited at best. 
The sea does not figure prominently in the national story, except perhaps as a barrier; 
a means to keep unwanted people, plant and animal pests and diseases out. Cheap 
air travel means that Australians fly across the oceans, often to destinations in Europe, 
north Asia, the Americas, and Africa with no real appreciation of the diversity of the 
oceans below. In common parlance the oceans are to be crossed more than they are 
to be understood.
Some of the more important questions that arise when discussing situational 
awareness are:
•	 How much situational awareness is enough which might otherwise be expressed as 
how much money is Government prepared to invest in understanding Australia’s 
maritime domains?
•	 What should be the balance of investment between civilian and military capabilities 
devoted to the Maritime Domain Awareness element of border protection?
•	 What is the optimal balance of investment between systems that can assist 
decision makers to obtain situational awareness and other systems that can 
respond when needed?
•	 Are there certain capabilities that contribute to situational awareness that must 
remain in sovereign control and if so, what are they?
•	 How is situational awareness achieved across jurisdictional, organisational and 
other boundaries?
•	 What is the impact of technological development and how do capability developers 
decide about the mix of platforms and sensor types in which to invest? 
•	 What should be investment balance between platforms and sensors that collect 
information and the back-end systems that process, exploit and disseminate the 
results to decision-makers?
None of these questions is capable of being answered in isolation from any of the others. 
In the 1980s, the ICT revolution began to transform all human activities, including those 
concerned with maritime domain awareness. No longer is it sensible or sufficient to 
invest in platforms, such as ships and planes and sensors such as radars and cameras. 
Data processing, storage, retrieval and dissemination systems need to be capable 
of handling the data provided by sensors in order that best use can be made of the 
information that has been collected. This suggests three further principles that need 
to be applied as the system continues to develop.
•	 Ensure that data, irrespective of source, is not left unprocessed and analysed for 
want of appropriate investment in backend systems.
•	 Where possible automate data flows, analysis and dissemination – save time, 
reduce errors and release staff for higher order tasks where judgement is essential.
•	 Minimise, to the extent possible, the amount of data in the system that is classified.
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These additional considerations call for the development 
of a systems approach to maritime domain awareness that 
comprehends that each and every element of the system is, 
or may be, connected to every other element. The power of 
the system, including its resilience and redundancy is that 
sensors and platforms become nodes; they both contribute to 
and take information from the system. This relatively simple 
concept is extraordinarily complex to implement. Legislative 
restrictions, organisational impediments and a plethora of competing and conflicting 
technical standards combine to make cooperation and coordination very hard. 
In the past decade substantial progress has been made in creating a system that 
provides maritime domain awareness to Australian decision makers. Perhaps the 
most important outstanding task is for a narrative to be developed that explains the 
importance of the safety and security of Australia’s maritime domains to the nation’s 
broader national security interests and economic well-being. These matters have not 
been well-articulated to the broader public in a comprehensive and comprehensible 
way. Sectional interests, for obvious reasons, discuss, for example, marine parks, 
commercial shipping policy, and the need for new submarines and surface ships. 
Needed is a story that draws the strands together to show how they are linked and to 
provide context for investment decisions that must be made in the coming decade, 
some of which will have consequences well into the second half of the 21st century.
Against a rapidly changing region dominated by the rise of China, India and, closer 
to home, Indonesia, Australia’s approaches to understanding its maritime domains 
will be influenced by strategic factors and diplomatic judgements as well as 
operational imperatives. Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States and its 
relationships with regional neighbours may be expected to have a profound impact on 
the strength of the information sharing and interoperability regimes on which so much 
of Australia’s maritime domain awareness depends. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to explain in plain English some 
of the principles, concepts and terms that maritime domain awareness practitioners 
grapple with on a daily basis. Second, it points to a series of challenges that 
governments face in deciding how to spend scarce tax dollars to deliver a maritime 
domain awareness system that is necessary and sufficient for the protection and 
promotion of Australia’s national interests.
This relatively 
simple concept 
is extraordinarily 
complex to 
implement.
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INTRODUCTION
“If it happened outside Sydney Heads, it didn’t happen as far as Australian voters 
are concerned.”
A cynical view of old time NSW politicians 
Recounted by Alan Reid1
Australia has a vital interest in knowing a great deal about its maritime domains. 
Knowing what is happening to the oceans themselves and to the life they sustain 
presents one set of challenges and opportunities. Knowing about human activities 
that take place on, through and over these seas and oceans presents another set. A 
comprehensive maritime situational awareness system seeks to synthesise knowledge 
of the environment with knowledge about human activity into a Common Operating 
Picture (COP) which is shared between multiple users who take from the COP what 
they need to support their decisions and activities.
This purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to explain in plain English some 
of the principles, concepts and terms that maritime domain awareness practitioners 
grapple with on a daily basis. Second, it points to a series of challenges that 
governments face in deciding how to spend scarce tax dollars to deliver a maritime 
domain awareness system that is necessary and sufficient for the protection and 
promotion of Australia’s national interests.
There are no silver bullet solutions to these challenges. Rather there are balances to 
be struck between institutions, platforms, sensors, data processing and dissemination 
systems. Time is a further consideration. A longer view can reveal different information 
priorities and needs that demand different responses to those of interest from a 
shorter term perspective. 
Setting the Scene
The Australian story, or legend, since white settlement is one of the bush and the 
Outback. Its heroes and heroines are those who ventured beyond the Great Dividing 
Range to explore and settle the vast and inhospitable interior. The epic, if ill-fated, 
journeys are those of Burke and Wills, John McDowall Stuart, Ludwig Leichhardt and 
Edward John Eyre.
In contrast, who has heard of Bass and Flinders, or John Bertrand and Ben Lexcen?2 
How many Sydneysiders know that the small ferries that bustle around the harbour 
bear the names of the ships of the First Fleet which brought nearly 1500 souls from 
Britain to Botany Bay in 1787-88? Ned Kelly was a bushranger and is a household name. 
1 Reid, A. The Whitlam Venture, Hill of Content Publishing, Sydney, 1976, p73.
2  George Bass discovered the strait that bears his name between mainland Australia and Tasmania and 
Mathew Flinders was the English navigator first to circumnavigate the Australian continent in 1801-3. 
John Bertrand was the Skipper of the yacht Australia II which won the America’s Cup, the first non-US 
challenger to do so, in 1983, after 132 years of American domination. Ben Lexcen designed the ‘winged 
keel’ which provided Australia II with an important technological advantage.
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Yet, Mary Bryant, her husband and seven others who stole Governor Phillip’s cutter and 
sailed it from Sydney to Timor in 1791 – an amazing journey of 3254 miles in 69 days - 
barely rate a footnote in the history books.3 
Those who created the Australian nation made much of the “Island Continent” which 
is “girt by sea”. “One nation, one continent” was a recurrent theme of the federalists 
in the 19th Century. From the earliest days of European settlement, the threat of 
attack and even invasion has been a constant theme – French, Russians, Germans, 
Japanese and, more recently asylum seekers who seek to reach Australia by boat, 
play on a strand of vulnerability and insecurity which is deeply ingrained in the 
national psyche. 
In something of a paradox, given the legend of the bush and our perceived 
vulnerabilities, the overwhelming majority of Australians (85% or more) live within 
50km of the sea, most of them in a handful of capital cities. Yet the appreciation of 
most Australians of what lies beyond the horizon as we sit on the beach and soak up 
the sun, for the most part can be written on the back of postage stamp.
By virtue of geography, territorial claims and a series of legal obligations most of 
which have emerged since the end of World War 2, Australia has responsibilities for 
understanding and maintaining as generally secure 10% of the world’s oceans not just 
in its own interests but on behalf of the international community as a whole. 
The Australian economy is fundamentally dependent on the sea lines of 
communication remaining open and safe. 99% by volume of all goods which enter 
or leave Australia do so by ship. These sum to more than 80% of the total value of 
Australia’s imports and exports.
However viewed, Australia will need to be substantially more aware of its maritime 
domains in the future if it is to protect and advance its national security, economic 
prosperity, social cohesion and regional influence in the decades to come.
3  For a summary account see the entry under Mary Bryant in Pike, D. (ed), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Vol 1, 1788-1850, A-H. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1966.
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Organisation
The paper is organised into seven chapters.
The first discusses the concept of situational awareness with particular reference 
to the maritime domain and provides some definitions that are often confused or 
misunderstood in public discourse. The second describes the extent of Australia’s 
maritime domains and poses some dilemmas and challenges that are presented 
by the boundaries as they stand and also the changes to these boundaries that 
may occur as we move further into the 21st Century. The third describes the threat 
landscape that the MDA system seeks to capture and make available to decision 
makers. The fourth outlines the drivers of the Australian MDA system, those factors 
which make it what it is. The fifth approaches MDA through a system-of-systems 
approach and explains how networking technologies challenge current organisational 
paradigms because networks change the basis for information collection and 
management in and about the maritime domain. The sixth reviews the sources 
and methods from which Australian decision makers derive their awareness of the 
maritime domains today and also discusses systems and technologies that may be 
used in the future to strengthen this situational awareness. The seventh and final 
chapter pulls the strands together and makes some suggestions about what Australia 
might do next to ensure it maintains adequate oversight and governance of its 
maritime domains.
A Note on Sources
This paper draws on official documents, including departmental reports ministerial 
statements and white papers, all of which are openly available. 
The core themes and ideas, however, emerged from the closed workshops conducted 
in 2011 and from the comprehensive records of those events made by David 
Shackleton. Three years on and three governments later, the broad conclusions 
reached in the 2011 workshops stand. 
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SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA as it will be called in this paper, is a seemingly 
simple and straightforward concept. The term gained authority and currency in the 
United States in the 1990s and early 2000s and was given formal standing in a US 
Presidential Directive, NSPD-41/HSPD-13, entitled Maritime Security Policy, dated 21 
December 2004.4 The Presidential Directive defines the maritime domain as:
“All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering 
on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-
related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances.”
In summary anything and everything to do with the sea. This seems straightforward 
enough.
A series of subordinate documents flowed from the Presidential Directive, of which the 
most important is the US National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.5 The 
Plan, in effect, gives meaning to the word ‘awareness’ and combines the breadth of the 
maritime domain, the ‘what’, with an ambitious outline of the organisations, processes, 
technologies and other resources that would be needed to fulfil the President’s 
requirements. This is the ‘how’.
The US definition of MDA, although meaningful to a superpower which is capable, 
or has the confidence to assert that it is capable, of collecting, processing, storing, 
analysing, disseminating and using the huge amounts of data implied by the concept, 
must be approached with some caution by nations with more constrained resources, 
such as Australia. 
In fact, within the US, MDA has been applied in a somewhat more limited way than 
the Presidential Directive implies. Boiled down, MDA is to prevent bad people, such 
as terrorists, and bad things, such as drugs, from entering the United States. It also 
involves stopping these activities as far from the physical borders of the United States 
as possible. 
The key tool of MDA is a Common Operating Picture (COP) which is a compilation 
of data drawn from many sources and fused into information repositories and 
information systems and networks that are accessible to multiple users. The COP 
is as close to real time as can be obtained and provides actionable information 
from classified and unclassified sources in time for officials to detect, deter and, if 
necessary, defeat any human activity in the maritime domain that is considered to be 
inimical to the interests of the United States. The COP also provide information about 
weather and other environmental factors.
4  National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, Maritime 
Security Policy, dated 21 December 2004.
5  US National Strategy for Maritime Security: National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, 
Department of Homeland Security, October, 2005.
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Australian Terminology
Notwithstanding the vastness of Australia’s maritime domains, the phrase “maritime 
domain awareness” has been slow to enter the Australian lexicon. The phrase did not 
appear in the 2009 or 2013 Defence White Papers, the 2012 Force Posture Review or 
the Prime Minister’s 2013 National Security statement. The phrase has been used by 
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS). For example, in that 
organisation’s 2010-11 Annual Plan, one objective was:
To coordinate whole-of-government efforts in preventing, detecting and 
responding to potential or actual non-compliance with relevant laws in 
Australia’s maritime domain, and to provide maritime domain awareness 
across government.6
Similar words appeared in the Annual Report of 2011-12 which were repeated verbatim 
in the most recent 2012-13 Annual Report.
To coordinate whole-of-government efforts in detecting, reporting and 
responding to potential or actual non-compliance with relevant laws in 
Australia’s maritime domain, and to provide maritime domain awareness. 
This also includes coordinating the whole-of-government effort to respond 
to people smuggling.7 8
Although the term is used it is not defined. Maritime domain awareness of what 
precisely, for whom and for what purpose are questions that arise. 
The RAN document, Australian Maritime Doctrine, 2010, provides in the glossary 
the definition of maritime domain awareness that is used by the US Department 
of Defense:
The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of 
a nation.9
The MDA concept is not as straightforward as appears at first glance. 
Questions about how much or how little MDA is sufficient come down to judgements 
which have important ramifications for the utility of the MDA system to its users. 
Answers to the question, “How much is enough?” affect:
•	 Levels of investment in new capabilities, what those new capabilities should be and 
the order in which they are acquired and brought into service; 
•	 Tasking of sensor platforms and other sources that may provide relevant data; and
•	 Decisions about analysis priorities.
In sum the answers determine the overall utility of the system. 
6 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Plan, 2010-2011, Canberra, 2010, p19.
7 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Report 2011-12, Canberra, 2012, p60.
8 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Report 2012-13, Canberra, 2013, p41.
9 Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, Canberra, 2010, p199.
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Instead of “maritime domain awareness” relevant Australian publications often use 
the phrase “situational awareness” or “situational awareness in the maritime domain”. 
Irrespective of the term, Australia is seeking to substantially increase its understanding 
of the natural environment as well as human activities which occur above, on and 
under the seas which surround the continent. 
Given the huge size of the maritime areas of responsibility and even larger areas of 
interest, Australia cannot hope to achieve the understanding to which it may aspire 
on its own and from its own collection and analysis resources. Help is needed from 
the international community for access to data from satellites, from the resources of 
regional nations, international organisations and from commercial entities as well. 
Even with such help, Australian authorities are still forced to make choices about 
what information to (and not to) collect, process and disseminate. Agencies also 
need to judge how to make most effective use of the information at their disposal 
in terms of responses that have immediate impacts whilst delivering longer term 
benefits as well. 
A question to ask is whether the process of attaining MDA by any decision-maker 
differs in any significant way from the attainment of situational awareness by decision 
makers who operate in other of domains of human activity, including the land, the air, 
outer space and more recently, cyber space. Whilst the physical characteristics of 
these environments are fundamentally different, the processes by which information 
about these environments and human activity in and through them is gathered, 
analysed and used is similar. An area of growing complexity is where domain 
boundaries intersect and information needs to be shared between decision makers, 
collection agencies and response agencies across several domains. Information 
collected in one domain may have unrecognised relevance in another unless 
processes are established that encourage and permit cross-domain understanding 
and information sharing. Legal, cultural, operational and technical factors can all work 
to inhibit such flows.
A possible differentiator between the achievement of necessary and sufficient 
awareness in the maritime domain, in contrast to other domains, is in the complexity 
of the system, notably its organisational and legal complexity. A plethora of private, 
commercial, government and international interests intersect in the maritime domain 
in ways that are not emulated to the same degree in other domains. Highly complex 
sets of cooperative and competitive behaviours exist in the maritime domain that are 
codified in both the law and the lore of the sea. As the world’s oceans come under 
increasing pressure from many forms of human activity increasingly divergent views 
are emerging about how to reconcile or at least mediate between short and long 
term interests, economic and environmental imperatives and local and international 
equities. Some policy makers believe that the world’s oceans are a source of bounty 
and likely to remain so into the indefinite future. Others believe that the world’s oceans 
and ecosystems as we know them are under profound threat from environmental 
change and human exploitation. These opposed positions lead to behaviours and 
policy responses that can be inconsistent to the point of incoherence. The starting 
assumptions may profoundly influence, or bias, the structure, aims and priorities of 
any MDA system. To the extent that the bias is explicit and understood by system 
users, it can be compensated for in how data in the system is valued and how 
decisions and responses are formed.
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The following sections of this chapter outline the main terms and concepts that apply 
to any complex operational information gathering and decision making system. In this 
context MDA is a stand out example. When considered as a whole these terms and 
concepts indicate the complexity and the challenges that decision makers face when 
making operational and investment decisions that will provide adequate knowledge to 
decision makers to allow them to protect and advance Australia’s sovereign interests 
and to meet Australia’s international obligations in the maritime domain. 
Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness describes the comprehension that decision makers, at all levels, 
have of the environment in which they may be called on to make decisions – advance 
or retreat, turn right or left, hold position, allocate more resources to resolve a 
perceived problem, etc. Situational awareness is the sum of everything that a decision 
maker knows and believes when he or she makes any given 
decision. This does not mean that the decision maker knows 
all there is to be known about a particular situation. It does 
mean that a decision maker is prepared to make a decision 
on the basis of his or her understanding of that situation. The 
decision maker feels confident with the information at his or 
her disposal to decide what to do and to implement or order 
a course of action. Another way of thinking about this is to 
say that the decision maker believes he or she has sufficient 
information to permit the risks associated with known and 
even unknown information gaps to be accepted.
To the extent that there is general agreement in a decision-making team about what 
needs to be known before a decision can be made (the structure of the decision), 
and there is also general acceptance of the relevance and veracity of data that are 
gathered (the essence of the decision), shared situational awareness may be said 
to exist. An overwhelming risk with shared situational awareness is that it can lead 
to “group think”. Alternative interpretations of the available data are not considered 
because they run against the grain of the prevailing orthodoxy, or alternative options 
or courses of action are either not considered or ruled out because they do not accord 
with the prevailing frame of reference of the decision-makers. 
There is a common tendency to assert that better informed decisions lead, ipso facto, 
to better outcomes, than do less well-informed decisions. A common experience of 
those who have worked in large organisations is the boss who wants to know “all 
the facts” before deciding on a course of action. Apart from being a tried and true 
delaying tactic, this behaviour rests on the fallacy that “all of the facts” can be known. 
To the extent that uncertainty is removed, risk is assumed or asserted to be reduced. 
For many situations, this may well be the case. However, there are caveats. Many 
facts and the weightings given to them are context dependent. An objective lens for 
one person may seem biased or incomplete to another. Situational awareness implies 
something beyond the understanding of capabilities and dispositions; such as the 
locations of friendly, enemy and neutral ships in space and time and their course and 
speed. It implies at least some understanding, if not knowledge, of intent and suggests 
therefore some capacity for prediction or forecasting; of knowing with some degree of 
certainty what an adversary or a target of interest is likely to do, or may do, next. The 
facts of the situation, such as they are known, are provided by the Common Operating 
Picture, or COP.
Situational awareness 
is the sum of 
everything that a 
decision maker knows 
and believes when 
he or she makes any 
given decision.
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Common Operating Picture (COP) 
The COP is the sum of information about any given situation that is available to 
decision-makers. In its idealised form information from numerous sources and 
organisations is collected and fused into a coherent whole which is timely, accurate, 
and at a level of granularity relevant to any given user. The COP allows decision-
makers to make decisions on the basis of shared, reliable and trustworthy information 
about environmental factors such as weather as well as the disposition of friendly 
forces or units on the one hand and competitors and adversaries on the other. The 
very logic of the COP can present problems to intelligence agencies that seek to 
protect sensitive sources and methods through formal compartmentation processes. 
The mantra of security before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York was the “need-
to-know” principle. Post 9/11, a “need-to-share” principle came into vogue. The COP 
epitomises the “need-to-share” principle. 
Sensitive operations, such as a clandestine or covert activities conducted by Special 
Forces or a police task force may not be accessible through the COP. In the interests 
of Operational Security (OPSEC) these activities may demand their own deception 
plans, to disguise the Indicators and Warnings (I&W) that planning and preparation 
for particular operations and activities can generate and that may be observed by a 
potential adversary.
The COP therefore, is best thought of as an approximation, or summary of activities 
in a designated area of operations. Routine activities are displayed and provide a 
basis for shared understanding which is adequate for many but not all purposes. An 
emerging difficulty is that sensitive operations performed on the basis of sensitive 
intelligence, sometimes for very specific purposes, are increasingly routine. A further 
complicating factor is that operational headquarters are increasingly multi-agency 
and multi-national in character. There is a constant tussle between the requirement to 
preserve secrecy in order to strengthen OPSEC, thereby protecting the identity and 
capacity of intelligence sources, and simultaneously the need to ensure coordination 
of activities between those who may be involved or who have a stake in the outcomes 
of particular operations. 
A well-sourced and maintained COP can aid decision making especially where cross 
organisational coordination is needed to ensure that activities are at least de-
conflicted and better still synchronised to achieve the best overall effect. The COP 
can also help to rule in or rule out obvious possible courses of action and provide a 
basis for an agreed approach, including assignment of responsibilities and resources. 
“Group think”, as noted above, is a risk, but of a lesser order than the risk associated 
with agencies responding in an uncoordinated way to a given situation on the basis of 
less complete information that a COP can provide.
Technical Challenges for a Common Operating Picture
Numerous technical challenges confront those who would create a COP. Some of the 
most important are: data formats, time stamping, data storage and retention, data 
modification and symbology. 
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Data Formats
Different sensors often output data in different formats. Some formats are 
proprietorial whereas others are openly available. The COP processing engine must 
be capable of receiving and recognising data, irrespective of the format in which it is 
delivered, in order to add the information provided from that particular source to the 
overall picture. 
Time
The time taken for data from different sources to be collected, transmitted and 
processed through the system before being available through the COP may vary. 
Collection systems may not always use a common time standard, such as that 
provided by the US Global Positioning System (GPS). More generally, the processing 
system must make decisions about how to describe or represent an unfolding event 
from information from disparate sources which may be arriving out of sequence or 
with different time tolerances – plus or minus milliseconds to plus or minus minutes 
or even hours, days or weeks in the case of intelligence from 
human sources. Determining which piece of information about 
a particular event is most accurate from a time perspective 
is not always a trivial matter. Data, within the COP ages, 
and, depending on the data source, at different rates. Some 
data of operational relevance is enduring, such as tide times 
and height predictions; some, such as a weather forecast, 
has currency for some hours; and other data, such as an 
aircraft track may be current for a few minutes or less. The 
COP needs to account for the data aging process to present 
decision-makers with the most accurate representation of the 
situation of interest or concern.
Resolution
Different sensors view targets at different intervals and with different levels of 
fidelity. An example of radars that are used to detect aircraft makes the point. A high 
frequency sky-wave system such as Jindalee-Over-the-horizon Radar Network (JORN) 
might place the aircraft in a “box” in space and time that is a kilometre wide, several 
kilometres long and some thousands of feet deep. The presence and position of the 
aircraft might be checked once every 10 seconds. In contrast a microwave surveillance 
radar might place the same target in a box measured in metres and might update that 
information at intervals well less than a second. Sophisticated processing algorithms 
are needed to ensure that the data from these disparate systems is correlated to 
ensure that the tracks being developed in both systems are linked to signify that, in 
this example, there is only one aircraft that is being observed simultaneously by two 
systems and not two aircraft. 
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Data storage, retention and modification
Data from individual sensors is increasing substantially in volume. Communications 
networks, storage devices and processing systems need to be capable of handling 
this traffic. System owners need to make policy decisions about how much data to 
store, whether to store it on or off-line, and when to simply drop data because its value 
is considered to be limited. Each of these decisions has cost implications. They also 
impact on the COP and its utility for some, if not all users. An example of the issue is 
where tracks from separate sensors of the same object, say an aircraft, are combined 
into one track that is displayed on the COP. Who accepts responsibility for the track 
that is developed in the COP processing engine from the combination of the original 
data from contributing sensors? How accurate is that track and how are confidence 
levels assigned? What happens to the data from the original tracks? Where should 
that be stored for post event analysis and system performance reviews, for example? 
How these and numerous related questions are answered has a fundamental 
impact on the content and reliability of the COP and its ultimate utility as a tool for 
decision-makers. Such decisions also affect the design of the overall system and its 
establishment and running costs.
Symbology
At the end of the day, operators and decision-makers watch displays which are 
representations of reality drawn from data provided from numerous, disparate 
inputs. This is the COP. To the extent that operators believe, largely on the basis of 
experience, that the COP is a fair representation of reality, decisions are likely to be 
made on the basis of the information displayed. Over many years, conventions and 
standards have been developed as to how physical and human features should be 
represented on paper maps and charts. They are fixed and constant. Contours, roads, 
rivers and other features are readily understood. Digital representations provide 
operators some flexibility in how they choose to represent reality in ways that work 
best for them. Some displays allow operators to tailor colours and symbols which may 
assist sense-making at the individual level but which can cause confusion at the group 
level because the meanings and weightings that different people assign to different 
symbols and colours can vary markedly. As more agencies work more closely together 
on the basis of shared information that is represented to the broad community 
through a single COP, an important task will be to ensure that symbols on the display 
have shared meanings. There are technical, procedural and cultural dimensions to 
achieving such alignment.
A further risk, in this context, is the impact of cyber attack. Such an attack may do 
nothing more that move the symbols around on COP displays by small amounts – 
enough to plant doubt in the minds of operators and decision-makers. Such subtle 
disturbances may be more effective and difficult to overcome than an attack 
that shuts the system down completely. In the former case ambiguity can lead to 
uncertainty, indecision and delay. In the latter case, there is no question about the 
state of the COP and the need to gain situational awareness through alternative 
means immediately.
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Privacy and Security Protections
Information gathered in the quest for MDA may be subject to privacy laws and security 
constraints. These restrictions may prevent further dissemination of data from the 
collection agency to other organisations, including user and analytical agencies that 
are responsible for maintaining the COP. Legislation and policy must be carefully 
coordinated and balanced to ensure that individual privacy on the one hand and 
sources and methods of collection on the other, are carefully protected without 
compromising the value and the effectiveness of the COP. 
Ontology
The technical processes described in the previous paragraphs fit within a broader 
construct sometimes referred to as an “ontology”.  Simply put an ontology seeks to 
make explicit the assumptions, tacit understandings and biases made by humans 
that sit underneath any given model or construction of reality. An ontological 
approach tries to capture the essence of any given system in such a way that flaws 
or inadequacies might be exposed and at least taken into account if not rectified. In 
doing so, the prospect exists for involved agencies and individuals, to achieve common 
understandings about their aims, objectives and priorities as well as their tolerance 
for risk.
These high level understandings, if achieved, allow for a high degree of collaboration 
and coordination between organisations and agencies that contribute to the COP.
Related Concepts and Terms
There is a number of related terms and concepts which are important in any 
discussion about situational awareness. Three of the most important are Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance. These are often lumped together and given the 
shorthand acronym of “ISR”. Each of these words points to different approaches 
to information gathering which traditionally have been 
conducted by different agencies with different cultures for 
quite different purposes.
These distinctions are blurring. Sensors and the platforms on 
which they are mounted are increasingly flexible and multi-
modal, capable of performing, for example surveillance and 
reconnaissance tasks simultaneously. So called “big data” 
approaches to information processing increasingly permit 
data from many sources to be compared and for meaning 
to be extracted from the aggregation of tiny scraps of 
information that, uncorrelated, are innocuous. However, there 
remain important policy, institutional and legal impediments 
that work against the achievement of optimal outcomes in 
terms of information sharing for common purposes.
There remain 
important policy, 
institutional and 
legal impediments 
that work against 
the achievement of 
optimal outcomes in 
terms of information 
sharing for common 
purposes.
20 KOKODA FOUNDATION   |   KOKODA PAPER NO. 20
Intelligence fundamentally is about obtaining secret information secretly – entity A 
finding out something that entity B does not want entity A to know without entity B 
knowing for certain that entity A knows. Intelligence gathering is a deliberate process. 
In a perfect world intelligence agencies are provided with a range of collection 
requirements and a set of resources (including people, money, computers, sensors 
and other infrastructure) by their tasking and control authorities. The agencies match 
resources to tasks in an ordered fashion. Specific information about sources and 
methods of intelligence gathering are closely protected in an effort to allow them to 
remain as effective as possible for as long as possible. Once a source is compromised 
counter-measures can be swiftly applied and the collection agencies are faced with 
the task of finding other ways to regain access, if that is possible at all, to the same 
material in future as they has access to in the past.
Surveillance is the routine observation of activity surrounding any given observer or 
platform going about his/her/its normal business. The principal product of surveillance 
is the establishment of normalcy states and patterns against which unusual events 
or variations from the norm stand out. This might be an unusual weather event or 
biological phenomenon (eg. certain fish being caught in areas where they had not 
previously been seen), or an unusual exchange of people and goods at sea, or an 
unscheduled military exercise involving an unusual combination of ships, aircraft and 
other forces. Such events may lead to an immediate response or to more information 
being sought about the unusual event itself. 
The key attribute of any surveillance system is persistence. The system must be 
able to observe the area of interest over a sufficient length of time to build an 
understanding of normal behaviour which takes account of cyclical, seasonal and 
other variations which occur in predictable and repeatable ways. Exceptions or 
variations to the norm become apparent and allow the possibility for further, more 
detailed, investigation, through reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.
Reconnaissance is the targeted response to an alert that has been generated within 
the wider information or sense-making system of an organisation. Something “doesn’t 
look right”, or seems not to be consistent with normal behaviour or is pointed to 
by a snippet in an intelligence report which may be inconclusive in itself but raises 
an alert that warrants further deliberate information gathering by some form of 
direct observation.
Historically, ISR activities generally and intelligence operations specifically, have 
been viewed as support functions to operations, be they military or law enforcement 
in nature. Technological change is now drawing these functions into the heart of 
operations, defined broadly as consciously planned and directed responses to the 
environment and to unfolding events. This raises further challenges especially for 
those agencies with strategic assessment functions which need and value time for 
reflection and sense-making, usually from a longer term perspective often measured 
in decades.
Several other concepts merit explanation. They are additional factors that tasking and 
response agencies need to consider when planning and conducting operations. All are 
relevant to capability developers and operational planners in all aspects of military, 
law enforcement and border protection operations.
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Layered Approach is a phrase that captures the idea that there is no silver bullet 
in the world of ISR. Data from multiple sensors on multiple platforms, operating 
in different spectral bands is collected and collated. Such an approach builds 
resilience into the system and, perhaps more importantly, allows for much greater 
confidence to be assigned to the specific nature of observed events because they 
are seen from more than one perspective or through more 
than one lens. There is an important proviso, namely that 
the “dots are joined” or more formally, that the data is 
fused. When the data from space-based sensors, sensors 
mounted on aircraft and ship and land-based sensors are 
combined, in principle, ambiguity is reduced and the risk of 
misidentification of an object, such as a ship of a particular 
type, is reduced. 
Indicators and Warnings (I&W) are observable and observed precursor actions or 
events, which are insignificant in themselves and which experience suggests, may or do 
precede a particular action or event of significance. Sometimes potential adversaries 
and competitors seek to gain tactical and even strategic advantage by disguising their 
intent. They may, for example, conceal these precursor activities in order to achieve 
surprise. This is the art of deception which may be reinforced by deliberate counter-
surveillance activities. Sometimes the cessation or absence of some routine activity or 
event is the clue that a competitor or adversary may be about to stage a significant 
event aimed at delivering tactical, operational or strategic advantage. 
Operational Security (OPSEC) is a term that applies to efforts made by business 
owners, military commanders and heads of a criminal gangs, to name three examples, 
to prevent a competitor or adversary from observing I&W which may point to the 
intent, extent and timing of a particular activity. This may be a hostile takeover bid 
of a rival company, a surprise attack on an enemy position or plans to import a large 
quantity of drugs.
Counter Intelligence is a key defensive discipline of intelligence. As the term implies, 
counter intelligence activities are efforts taken by entity A to detect, deter and defeat 
efforts by adversaries or competitors to collect intelligence about A. The Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) has prime responsibility for counter 
intelligence in Australia. Most nations implement a range of security measures to 
deter intelligence gathering against them. Physical security measures include locks, 
bolts, bars, alarms and other intrusion detection devices. Personnel security measures 
include vetting of employees who have access to classified information. Information 
security measures include carefully established and documented procedures for 
creating, storing and transmitting classified information including hard copy and soft 
copy documents and records and information that might be transferred from person 
to person verbally. Counter intelligence officers seek to understand when the integrity 
of these barriers is threatened, or compromised, by whom and for what purpose.
Presence is an adjunct concept to situational awareness. Presence is the visible 
manifestation of ownership or stewardship. The presence of an Australian Navy ship 
or a Customs patrol aircraft for example, serves to remind those who see the ship or 
the plane that the Australian Government values its sovereign territory and adjunct 
seas. Presence operations can be used to reinforce to domestic audiences, as well 
as to others, that the integrity of Australia’s sovereign territories matters and is to be 
respected. This leads to the related concept of deterrence. 
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Deterrence is about persuading an actor not do something for fear of the 
consequences. The actor must believe that if he or she persists with a particular 
course of action the party that may be harmed has the means and the will to take 
retaliatory action and is likely to do so. Further, such retaliatory action will inflict 
an unacceptable level of harm on the actor seeking to cause the harm. Presence 
activities, such as Australian surveillance flights near foreign fishing vessels serve to 
remind the masters of those vessels of their licensing, reporting and other obligations 
to the Australian Government if they wish to fish lawfully in Australian waters. The 
further message is that breaches may well be discovered and prosecuted, leading to 
unacceptable losses by the fishing vessel owner s and operators.
The point to take away from this section of the paper is that any system that seeks to 
bring information together from disparate sources to present a model of reality, a COP 
in short, that is trusted, valued and used by decision-makers, is inherently complex. 
The next section of this paper describes Australia’s maritime geography and the 
challenges it presents to policy makers and response agencies.
AUSTRALIA’S MARITIME DOMAINS
Geography and Population
By virtue of geography, territorial claims and international legal obligations Australia 
has responsibilities for understanding and maintaining as generally secure roughly 
10% of the Earth’s seas and oceans not just in its own interests but on behalf of the 
international community as a whole. 
Big Numbers
Australia, by land area, is the world’s sixth largest country and the core maritime 
domain, that area for which Australia has some formal level of responsibility and 
accountability, is considerably larger than the continent itself. The numbers which 
relate to geography are large:
•	 The coastline of the Australian mainland is in the order of 36,000km.
•	 Beyond the mainland are thousands of islands, atolls and other features which 
generate their own coastlines which sum to almost 24,000km.
•	 The Exclusive Economic Zone generated by Australia and its offshore territories, 
including the Australian Antarctic Territory, is more than 10 million square 
kilometres, one of the largest in the world.
•	 The area for with Australia has maritime search and rescue (MARSAR), responsibilities 
under the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) is considerably larger again.
But Australia’s interests do not stop at these boundaries which have been agreed 
by treaties and other instruments of international law. Australia’s national security 
interests extend well beyond these limits to the western and northern extremities of 
the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, to the South Pacific, to the archipelago to the 
north and beyond to the South China Sea and into the Western Pacific as well.
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99% by volume and more than 80% by value of all goods which enter or leave Australia 
do so by ship. The Australian economy is fundamentally dependent on the sea lines of 
communication remaining open and safe.
There is simply no way that Australia can or even should develop and maintain 
comprehensive situational awareness of all of these areas on its own account and 
from its own resources. Information sharing with regional neighbours and allies is an 
essential ingredient to Australia’s approach to MDA. 
Geography also helps. Although the total areas of interest 
to Australia are vast, there are natural points of focus and 
attention. In the maritime context these are typically the straits 
or narrows through which ships must pass if they are to collect 
and deliver cargoes and move from one ocean to the next. To 
Australia’s north the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makasar 
Straits are vital links in the sea lines of communication that 
connect the nations of north Asia to the oil producing nations 
of the Middle East and to Australia’s minerals exporting ports 
as well. Australia has an abiding national interest in ensuring 
that these straits remain open and accessible in the interests 
of the nation’s economic and broader national security.
Small Numbers
In contrast to the large numbers that arise from Australia’s geography there are 
also some small ones. Australia’s population is 23 million (about 0.3% of the world’s 
population). The correspondingly small tax base, and the competing demands 
especially from the health, education and welfare sectors, limits options and forces 
choices about what to monitor and measure and, when necessary, how to respond. 
Australia’s population has doubled in the past 50 years and is expected to double 
again by 2050. Although Australia has the 14th largest economy in the world this 
represents only 2.2% of global GDP. Australia’s domestic market is tiny in global terms 
which presents particular challenges for capital intensive manufacturing industries 
which must look to export markets to succeed. 
The logic of markets in an increasingly globalised world also presents challenges 
to governments when they try to articulate what the nation needs in its intellectual 
and industrial base for the principle of self-reliance to have meaning. A succession 
of governments, through defence white papers and other reports, have struggled to 
define what self-reliance means and what areas of industry deserve explicit support 
in the direct interests of Australia’s national security. Such attempts as have been 
made, through the stated Priority Industry Capabilities (PICs) and Strategic Industry 
Capabilities (SICs), in successive Defence White Papers have had only limited impact 
in retaining, let alone developing, skills in these defined areas – most of which have 
direct relevance to the understanding and protection of Australia’s maritime domains.
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The amount of money that Australian governments invest on all aspects of 
understanding, managing and securing the maritime environment is difficult to gauge 
but a ball park figure is in the order of $15-20 billion annually. The Royal Australian 
Navy (RAN) is allocated most of these funds. The RAN is presently undergoing a major 
re-equipment program which will see a heavier and more capable fleet in service by 
2030. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) conducts long range maritime patrols 
using AP3-C Orion aircraft and operates the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network 
(JORN) which monitors Australia’s northern approaches especially for movements 
of aircraft and ships. The RAAF is set to acquire the Boeing P-8A long range maritime 
patrol aircraft to replace the Orions by 2020 and also a fleet of Northrop Grumman 
MQ-4C Triton High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 
Several other Commonwealth and State departments and agencies, some with penny-
packet budgets, attempt to fulfil a daunting set of requirements. The most important 
of these agencies is the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACPBS) 
which is responsible for coordinating and executing responses to non-military threats 
to Australia’s borders. The ACBPS has a small number of dedicated patrol vessels 
and contracts a private company to conduct airborne patrols using a fleet of capable 
Dash-8 aircraft. 
Information from these and other sources is collected and collated in various military 
and civilian command and control centres. The situational awareness derived provides 
the basis for tasking of ships, aircraft, radars, satellites, intelligence agencies, and 
liaison staff based in foreign capitals. Given the magnitude and complexity of the task, 
that the system works so well is something for which this nation can be proud.
Maritime Geography
The seas and oceans that surround the Australian continent as well as those that are 
more remote but still of vital interest are amazingly diverse. At one extreme are the 
small coral outcrops, tropical islands and warm and usually calm seas of the Torres 
Strait and Great Barrier Reef. At the other are the cold and often mountainous seas 
of the Southern Ocean that lie between the Australian mainland and the Australian 
Antarctic Territory (AAT). There are rich fishing grounds and areas where marine life is 
scarce. There are shallow waters on the continental shelf and through the archipelago 
to Australia’s north and there are exceptionally deep waters beyond the continental 
shelf in the Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans. 
These very different environments present enormous challenges to marine architects 
and capability developers because of the complex cost/capability trade-offs and 
compromises that need to be made when decisions about new ships are being 
made. There is also the question of distance and endurance. The larger ships and 
submarines of the RAN must be capable of operating independently for extended 
periods, including in waters well to Australia’s north. Small patrol craft, including 
those operated by the ACBPS, must still be capable of operating quite some distance 
from their home ports as has been demonstrated over the past decade in response 
to the challenge presented to Australian authorities by people smugglers and 
asylum seekers.
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THREATS
The prime responsibility of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to counter existential 
threats to the nation as and when they emerge. These have been conceived in the 
past as direct threats by other nations, Japan in World War 2 being the most obvious 
and recent example. The prospect of conventional warfare, meaning the use of kinetic 
effects (as some say ‘heat, blast and frag.’) in a planned and deliberate way between 
nation states remains the most demanding and enduring security concern of any 
government and the Australian Government is no exception. This possibility drives 
major decisions about the force structure, disposition, readiness and sustainability 
of the ADF. 
The likelihood of a direct attack by a foreign power against 
Australia in the foreseeable future is remote, although several 
nations in north Asia do possess missiles with the range to 
attack targets in Australia. More likely scenarios involve the 
deployment of Australian forces in Coalition operations away 
from Australia in efforts to strengthen the overall security of a 
particular region or nation.
Direct threats to Australia are likely to come through a range 
of criminal activities some of which may be State-sanctioned, 
if not State sponsored. These may include attacks on 
information and the information infrastructure (cyber attacks) 
which might also damage the physical critical infrastructure 
(power grids, water and sewerage, transportation systems, 
etc). Large scale money-laundering operations can also be 
imagined. These could be expected to have a measurable 
negative effect on the domestic economy and second and 
third order impacts which call into question Australia’s 
reliability as a trading partner and as a safe place in which 
to invest. The customary bifurcation between state and non-state actors is becoming 
more difficult to discern which is already presenting challenges to governments as 
they seek to understand whether a predominantly military or a policing response is 
called for in any given circumstance.
Principal responsibility for civil border protection in Australia rests with the ACBPS 
which has a well-established taxonomy of threats that are described by the 
following headings:
•	 Illegal exploitation of natural resources
•	 Illegal activities in protected areas
•	 Unauthorised maritime arrivals
•	 Prohibited imports and exports
•	 Piracy, robbery or violence at sea
•	 Maritime terrorism
•	 Compromise to bio-security and
•	 Marine pollution.
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These threats are enduring. In coming decades, however, they are likely to become 
increasingly connected and entwined and those with malfeasant intent are likely 
to exploit the dislocation and vulnerability caused by changing natural, political, 
economic and social environments. Nations and organisations that seek to act 
unlawfully enjoy a degree of flexibility and agility that is denied to governments that 
operate within the rules of domestic and international law. Networking technologies 
are as generally available to wrongdoers as they are to the law-abiding. This presents 
law enforcement agencies with a range of unprecedented challenges, not the least 
of which is how to balance the legitimate interests of the State to protect itself and its 
citizens with rights of individual liberty and privacy. 
Some broad comments, looking to 2030, about each of the eight threat vectors listed 
above follow.
Compromise to Bio-Security
The most serious and enduring threat is a substantial breach of the quarantine barrier 
leading to a pandemic in the Australian population, which may cause many deaths 
and enormous social and economic dislocation. Public health officials continuously 
scan the progress of diseases in other countries, such as Asian bird flu. They seek to 
understand the pathology of the disease, how it spreads (animal to animal, animal to 
people, people to people) and how it may be countered (vaccine, travel restrictions, 
quarantine for infected people, etc).
The introduction of exotic plant or animal disease could be expected to cause a 
great deal of harm to affected sectors of primary industry regionally and, possibly, 
nationally. There would almost certainly be consequences for exports and, more 
broadly, across the economy. 
Presently the Department of Agriculture has policy and front line responsibility to 
identify specific bio-security threats and to take the steps necessary to negate them. 
People are more likely to bring disease into Australia than are animals, so, looking 
ahead, this may be more a problem for border protection authorities at Australia’s 
airports than for those protecting the maritime borders.
With respect to goods of animal and plant origin, Australian quarantine authorities 
are using increasingly sophisticated analytical tools to determine which ships and 
shipments demand close inspection. The inspection process can be slow and time-
consuming especially if small objects, such as insect larvae, are being looked for.
Looking towards 2030 the likelihood of a major compromise to Australia’s bio security 
will increase, to a point approaching certainty. This is a function of the increased 
numbers of people (especially), animals, plants and products (such as timber) that will 
cross the border. 
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Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals (Asylum Seekers)
For the past decade the question of Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals has been 
politically divisive and damaging to governments and to Australia’s international 
reputation as well. In recent years an overwhelming proportion of the surveillance 
and response assets available to the ACBPS have been employed on this single border 
protection task in the Christmas Island to Darwin corridor, leaving many other tasks 
undone or underdone. The political imperative to be seen to be managing the flow 
of people seeking entry to Australia via small boats, has taken precedence, in terms 
of the allocation of scarce response assets, over the countering of other threats. This 
has been a question of relative priorities. Governments have accepted an additional 
level of risk from border security threats becoming manifest at Australia’s ports and 
airports and around Australia’s southern coastline in order 
to deal with the persistent flow of people who have sought 
to enter Australia via boats in the north-west. 
Most people who are in Australia illegally arrive by air as 
legitimate visitors and overstay their visas. They are not 
the focus of political controversy which is reserved for 
those would-be immigrants who pay criminals to bring 
them to Australia by boat. Typically these boats leave 
fishing villages in Java and often they set a direct course 
for Christmas Island, some 200nm to the south. The ACBPS 
sometimes, but not always, receives advance notice that a 
boat is on its way. The modus operandi of many boats is to 
reach Australian territorial waters at Christmas Island and 
then to announce their presence and seek assistance. 
Today there are 30-40 million people in the world who have been displaced by war, 
famine, and racial and religious persecution; they are all searching for a safe and 
secure home. Looking towards 2030 Australia is likely to remain a destination for more, 
possibly many more, asylum seekers than is the case today. The ‘push’ factors, some 
of which are listed below, are not going to go away any time soon. Indeed they are 
likely to amplify.
•	 continued overall growth in global population – from seven billion today to more 
than 10 billion by the turn of this century;
•	 continued growth of cities;
•	 chronic unemployment and under employment, especially of young men, in the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia; 
•	 increased pressure on food and water supplies, especially in the poor 
neighbourhoods of cities and drought prone areas;
•	 the impacts of global warming (however caused) – sea level rise, more frequent 
and extreme weather events;
•	 increased pressure on energy supplies, notably oil and gas, until substitute fuels 
are found; and
•	 continued persecution of religious and ethnic minorities.
Nations and 
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Aid programs that attack the root causes of these fundamental challenges faced 
by humanity may help, but Australia’s contributions, by definition, will be small 
and of marginal influence. Concerted action by many nations working closely 
together will be needed if the numbers of displaced people are to be brought within 
manageable bounds. 
Meanwhile, the Australian MDA system must be capable of anticipating peaks and 
troughs in asylum seeker flows in order to manage limited response capabilities as 
effectively as possible. 
Almost certainly not all who seek asylum in Australia have genuine or sustainable 
claims. There is also a clear risk that some purported asylum seekers have links to 
terrorist organisations and criminal syndicates. They are not people this country would 
seek to welcome as new citizens. A rigorous clearance and vetting regime, therefore, 
makes sense. These processes can be time-consuming and costly and delay can lead 
to medical and psychological problems for some asylum seekers whilst their cases are 
being investigated. 
Prohibited Imports and Exports
The importation and export of prohibited goods is probably the threat to Australia’s 
border that most frequently occurs. Criminal activity, from very well-funded and 
planned activities to those that are opportunistic and ‘one-off’, provides a threat 
vector which is persistent, diverse and increasingly difficult to counter. Narcotics 
and precursor chemicals for drug manufacture are of obvious concern. So too 
are weapons, endangered and exotic animal and plant species, pornography and 
other materials subject to censorship laws. Intelligence and effective liaison with 
counterpart agencies well ahead and behind the border is essential to counter 
these threats. 
Looking towards 2030 the incidence of the import and export of prohibited goods 
is certain to rise as a function of: the anticipated increase in the numbers of people 
entering and leaving Australia and the range and volume of goods being exported and 
imported in an increasingly global market with global supply chains.
Organised crime syndicates are expected to be deeply involved in these activities. The 
ACBPS understands this only too well and also understands the enormous advantage 
gained by any syndicate that can call on the help of trusted ‘insiders’. To this end, the 
ACBPS has initiated a major internal reform program that aims to weed out corrupt 
officers and to instil a culture, backed by review and investigation processes, which 
places exceptionally high value on individual and corporate integrity. This shift in 
emphasis and culture is consistent with the ACBPS moving from a passive compliance 
checking to an active policing mindset. 
So-called “big data” analytics may well provide pointers to malfeasant behaviour 
that presently goes undetected. Increasingly sensitive and reliable surveillance and 
electronic inspection technologies at points of entry and departure will be further 
elements in a layered system that is increasingly integrated and hard to beat. The 
point of this system will be twofold; to detect and prosecute illicit importation and 
export activities and to force those with malfeasant intent to turn their attention from 
Australia to ‘softer’ markets elsewhere.
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Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
Illegal fishing is the most important threat within this broader category. In recent 
years, there has been a noticeable decline in the detection and apprehension of 
foreign fishing vessels (FFV) fishing illegally in Australian waters. A combination of 
factors would seem to be at work; better navigation systems which allow FFV to not 
stray unintentionally into Australian waters, better air and sea surveillance and, in 
some places, less fish. Organisations involved in illegal fishing may also have very 
good intelligence about Australian fisheries enforcement activities, allowing incursions 
to be carefully timed to avoid being caught. Fisheries authorities are concerned that 
as fish stocks dwindle in less well-managed fisheries FFV may be tempted to make 
systematic incursions into Australian fisheries, which are among the best managed 
in the world. 
Looking towards 2030 the nexus between organised criminal activities, fishing, legal 
and illegal, and the smuggling of goods is almost certain to strengthen. There is 
already evidence of such activities including licensed boats that under-report their 
catches and transfer the surplus to waiting support vessels. Other licensed boats have 
been known to dock at Australian ports to replenish fuel and supplies and have tried to 
use these activities as cover for smuggling operations. Others have rendezvoused at 
sea with vessels that are used to transfer contraband across the customs barrier.
Future similar operations will be well-planned, well-resourced and well-executed. 
Multi-source intelligence, careful analysis of financial transactions, and close inter-
agency cooperation will be essential if these types of activities are to be thwarted.
Illegal Activities in Protected Places and Marine Pollution
These threats have the potential to harm the marine environment, notably those 
areas which have been designated as marine parks and which are deemed to have 
conservation or other values that merit special protection. The Great Barrier Reef 
is one obvious area, of world heritage value, where conscious efforts are made to 
minimise damage to the ecosystem caused by human activity. 
Looking towards 2030 pressure will build on all of Australia’s marine reserves from 
commercial and leisure activities as well as from broader environmental changes. 
Emerging surveillance technologies that use inexpensive networked sensors should 
assist regulatory authorities to gain a more comprehensive and timely understanding 
of the state of the marine reserves as well as human activity that occurs in them. 
In the next two decades, shipping will be progressively 
more closely monitored. Technologies such as the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) will record and track the 
movements of ships globally, and anomalies in course 
and speed will be readily detected and capable of further 
investigation. Ships that seek to avoid or confuse AIS 
systems by not disclosing their presence will stand out as 
non-cooperative targets and immediately arouse suspicion. 
Such systems will need to be tightly integrated into the 
information systems already in use by the ACBPS to reach 
their full potential.
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Piracy, Robbery or Violence at Sea
These threats have not yet manifested themselves in, or close to, Australian waters. 
However, piracy globally is increasing and has the potential to disrupt imports to, and 
exports from, Australia. RAN ships have been involved in anti-piracy operations off the 
Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. Australia is cooperating with regional nations 
to ensure that piracy and associated threats are kept as far from Australian waters as 
possible and that these activities are not allowed to disrupt sea commerce through the 
critical straits to Australia’s north.
Looking towards 2030 piracy is likely to remain an active threat, especially in the 
western Indian Ocean. Some ships that sail to and from Australia could be at risk of 
being overtaken by pirates. There is every possibility that pirates will become better 
organised and resourced possibly through links with organised crime syndicates. 
Maritime Terrorism
Since 9/11 Australia has devoted considerable attention to understanding the terrorist 
threat to Australia and to developing robust counter-terrorism plans, capabilities 
and coordination arrangements between agencies and jurisdictions. Several plots by 
Australian citizens and residents have been foiled and the would-be terrorists brought 
to trial. There is no evidence on the public record of terrorists planning to commit 
acts of maritime terrorism against Australian ships, foreign ships serving Australian 
ports, the ports themselves or their approaches. A particular and growing concern is 
the vulnerability to terrorist attack of the gas platforms off north-western Australia. 
These structures are large, difficult to reach and more resilient that might seem to be 
the case at a cursory glance. Although the planning of such attacks might proceed 
in secret, almost certainly there would be indicators and warnings of the proposed 
attacks, especially if carried out by an organised group. Well-integrated counter 
intelligence, security intelligence and law enforcement organisations, providing they 
have the systems and legal authority to ‘join the dots’ and share what they know, 
would permit counter actions to be planned and taken.
Of possibly greater concern, certainly from a public perception and confidence 
perspective, is the prospect of a successful attack on a cruise ship in an Australian 
port or with embarked Australian passengers. Relevant authorities are alert to this 
possibility and invest effort to ensure that such an event does not occur.
The ACBPS is aware of the magnitude of that task that the threat vectors above 
present. Its approach is summed up by the phrase “intelligence led and risk based” If 
there is one common thread, it is money. At some point, money, to be of long term use, 
must enter the legitimate finance system and here, with increasingly sophisticated 
data analytics, is where it can be identified and tracked.
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In May 2014, the Commonwealth announced the formation 
of a single frontline operational border protection agency 
from 1 July 2015. The new agency, to be known as the 
Australian Border Force (ABF) will be established within a 
single Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
that combines the functions currently performed by the 
Department that already has that name with the ACBPS. 
The Australian Border Force will draw together the 
operational border, investigations, compliance, detention and 
enforcement functions of the two existing agencies. Whether 
Department of Agriculture officials who are responsible 
for quarantine matters will be rolled into the ABF is yet to 
be determined.
The COP must account for all of these threats. The information 
to hand is used to determine levels and locations of response 
activities by the civil and defence capabilities that Australia 
commits to border protection and to maritime security 
more generally. Where connections can be made between 
threats such as the identification of an organisation that is financing people and drug 
smuggling activities and possibly illegal fishing as well, the possibility exists to negate 
or remove such nodes. The help of other governments is often needed for these sorts 
of activities to be carried out.
DRIVERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN MDA SYSTEM
A number of drivers or vectors have been identified that have major impact on the 
structure and size of Australia’s maritime domain awareness system. These are not 
altogether mutually compatible or consistent and judgement is needed to reconcile 
conflicting interests and values sufficiently to allow for wise decisions to be made 
about current operational priorities and future capability investments. The drivers 
identified by this study, in no priority or other particular order are:
•	 Climate change - the impacts of climate change and increasing understanding of 
the rate at which climate is changing and the impact of those changes on oceans, 
coasts, including cities, and marine life;
•	 The US Alliance – how the alliance might alter in form and substance in the next 20 
– 30 years to reflect the rise of China and India on the one hand and the need for 
fiscal restraint on the other;
•	 Fiscal realities - the desire of Government to reduce costs across the board, 
including those associated with the governance of Australia’s maritime domains and 
its broader maritime interests;
•	 Organisational imperatives - for institutions, including the single Services 
acting in their own interests, the ADF acting as a whole, Commonwealth 
departments and agencies and the intelligence community to remain relevant and 
adequately-resourced;
•	 The States and Territories - their rights, responsibilities and interests, especially 
those of Queensland (coal exports, the Great Barrier Reef and the proximity of 
New Guinea) and Western Australia (energy and mineral exports);
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•	 The “global commons” - and Australia’s obligations and responsibilities as a good 
international citizen;
•	 Cross border flows - the economic, political, social and bio-security impacts of 
predicted increases in all cross border flows - including people, animals, plants, 
money, goods and information in a globalised and networked world;
•	 Non-State and transnational actors – the influence and impact of organised 
criminal groups, terrorist and other extremist organisations; and
•	 Technological Change – as complex networked systems, including complex 
networked threats, that are software-defined and data driven, become the defining 
context for human cognition and action instead of the platform-based systems of 
the past. 
To the extent that these drivers can be prioritised, reconciled and arbitrated, the 
prospect exists for a national maritime domain awareness strategy and associated 
narrative to emerge that is compelling, sustainable and defensible. It must embrace 
more than military interests and capabilities. It must pull together all of the strengths 
of the Australian nation as they apply to its maritime domains and interests and 
encapsulate what Australia seeks to do and be known for doing with regard to the 
governance of those domains.
A clear consensus of the panels which informed this Kokoda paper was that 
incremental investments and adjustments are unlikely to meet the information 
requirements of decision makers in the future. Demands of timeliness and fidelity 
(accuracy and level of detail) will be in tension with inevitable and growing cost 
constraints. Adoption of new technologies may mitigate but not entirely resolve this 
tension. A ‘more of the same’ approach will not deliver the situational awareness that 
Ministers, senior officials and frontline staff will consider necessary and sufficient for 
Australia to govern its maritime domains as an essential element of national strategy. 
When presented with this dilemma authors of papers such as this are often tempted 
to call for an organisational, whole-of government response, usually led by the Prime 
Minister and his department. Such calls have behind them an assumption that the 
constitutional, legislative and institutional arrangements which define political and 
bureaucratic power in Australia are quite flexible and that they can accommodate 
such an approach. Ministers, however, worry about whole-government approaches 
because they present the possibility of loss of power and influence by particular 
portfolios and, worse, they can lead to money being diverted from the departmental 
appropriation to the whole of government scheme over which Ministers and their 
departments have reduced influence. From an outsider’s perspective what may seem 
a rational and cost-effective way of making the best of new technologies can be seen 
as a threat from the Ministerial and portfolio perspective. 
Australia, like every other nation on Earth, is struggling to come to terms with the 
implications of the internet and its associated technologies. These uncertainties and 
risks, however, seem not to have affected it ready and wide embrace. The internet 
provides means for routine and profound cooperation and collaboration across 
organisational, jurisdictional and sovereign boundaries. How this can be achieved 
within the fixed framework of a federal system and departments of state that are 
strongly entrenched and enmeshed in the public policy framework is less obvious. 
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Perhaps a longer term approach will be necessary which places higher value on 
Ministers and public officials possessing and being rewarded for the way in which they 
apply such skills as team building, team work and collaboration than has been so in 
the past. How well Ministers and officials work across rather than within organisational 
and other boundaries may become a differentiator for promotion, for example. Such 
attitudinal and behavioural shifts are hard to effect, take time and, although possibly 
driven centrally, can be implemented within organisations that already exist. 
A maritime domain awareness system, as described in the following chapter, is only 
possible because of the internet and related technologies that allow for data from many 
sources to be brought to bear on any given situation. The strength of the MDA system 
is directly proportional to the extent to which boundaries that were set and might have 
made sense in the 19th and 20th centuries can be negotiated to allow best advantage to 
be taken of information that is shared, valued and used in ways not possible in the past.
In the maritime domain, as in all complex areas of public policy, there are no 
simple answers and there is no clean sheet of paper start. There are strong vested 
institutional, legal, economic, commercial and other interests that have a clear view 
of what they do, for whom, at what price and with whom they will and will not, may 
and may not cooperate. The concept of maritime domain awareness challenges 
the hierarchical information flows of these arrangements and encourages the 
development of mechanisms and behaviours which reward data sharing and the 
integration of information from disparate sources into common operating pictures 
and reference frameworks. For some organisations and the individuals in them, this 
behaviour is counter-intuitive and change has been resisted and has been slow. 
Supercomputers are allowing humans to understand and visualise the Earth’s seas 
and oceans as a complex system of systems in which subtle links and influences, not 
previously amenable to observation, can now be analysed and interpreted. This applies 
to physical structures such as the seabed, to ocean chemistry and interactions with the 
atmosphere, to the biology of plants and animals that live in the seas and to human 
activities as well. All actors with oversight or regulatory responsibility in the maritime 
domain must look beyond their immediate concerns and responsibilities if they are to 
really appreciate the point and impact of the work they do on the broader system.
Distance, isolation and alliance relationships with the dominant 
naval power of the time (Britain from the arrival of the First 
Fleet in 1788 to World War 2, and the United States since then) 
have led a succession of Australian governments to adopt a 
reactive and, until quite recently, poorly coordinated approach 
to sustained investments in the nation’s ability to understand, 
protect and promote its vital maritime interests. Australia has 
basically looked to our major alliance partner to bear the 
strategic weight of the relationship which, in the case of the 
United States, is the implied nuclear guarantee. Australia’s 
contribution has been the provision of real estate (hosting of joint 
facilities such as the intelligence facility at Pine Gap near Alice 
Springs, Marines in Darwin for training purposes and soon, space 
surveillance systems at North West Cape) and the commitment 
of forces to conflict zones, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. These forces have tactical value 
and, possibly more importantly, are tangible expressions of commitment to the Alliance. 
They add legitimacy to American actions on the one hand and warfighting capacity 
(even if limited) on the other. A corollary is that Australia’s options to exert influence in 
its own right through diplomacy, and force if needed, are correspondingly constrained. 
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Australian strategic and defence policy has long emphasised the importance of self-
reliance which has implied a certain capacity for action independent of our major 
alliance partner. Whatever that term might have meant in the past, it seems either 
less relevant or in need of fundamental re-definition in an increasingly globalised 
and interdependent world. The 2015 Defence White paper presently being developed 
presents an opportunity for this aspect of policy to be re-visited and re-interpreted. 
To do so would be to make an important contribution to strategic debate and to 
Australia’s perceptions of itself today and into the future. In the present context it 
should also provide insight into investments that Australia anticipates needing to make 
in MDA to meet future challenges in the maritime domain decisively. 
Australia’s interests, in the next 20-30 years, and especially in the so-called ‘global 
commons’, of which the oceans are but one example, may not intersect as neatly or as 
fully as they have with those of the United States since World War 2. This is not to say 
that the alliance relationship will not remain at the foundation of Australian strategic 
policy. It will. It is to say that the nature of this relationship, may need to be adjusted 
to mutual benefit. Events in the Crimea and continuing conflict in the Middle East 
may distract the US from committing the weight of effort to Asia that the re-balance 
promised. The US may well look to Australia to do more heavy-lifting than has been 
the case in the past and most of this is likely to be in the maritime domain.
Both Australia and the US may need to think again about the shape and extent of their 
relationship to take better account of their straightened financial circumstances in a 
region that is growing rapidly in economic terms and in which nations are becoming 
more wealthy, confident and assertive. Choices exist and how they are exercised may 
be expected to have profound impact on Australia’s place in the region and the world 
for the next 30-50 years.
The world is moving beyond a decade in which national security affairs have been 
dominated by responses to terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Centre in New York. Osama Bin Laden is dead and the bulk of western forces, 
including Australians have withdrawn from Afghanistan. The world is slowly recovering 
from the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis and the planet shows increasing signs of 
stress from global warming. These massive forces for change present an opportunity, 
indeed a responsibility, for Australia to develop a much deeper understanding of its 
place in the world as a sovereign nation and to contextualise its interests, especially 
in the maritime domains for which is has sovereign, legal and moral obligations. 
Capacity for decisive independent action in protection and advancement of Australia’s 
maritime interests is a costly enterprise. New investments should only proceed on the 
basis of the clearest possible understanding of Australia’s maritime domains and their 
effect on the security and well-being of the Australian nation. 
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A SYSTEM-OF SYSTEMS APPROACH TO 
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
The purpose of any situational awareness system is to aid decision making. If the 
system is working properly decisions should be better informed and synchronised 
between agencies and organisations with shared, complementary or overlapping 
responsibilities. Decisions must also be timely. 
Situational awareness systems are comprised of several elements 
•	 A requirements setting system which, in an ideal model, is based on a clear 
understanding of what decision makers want to know;
•	 A tasking system which translates requirements into the tasking of collection assets; 
•	 A collection system which gathers the data that has been sought and passes the 
data to a processing system;
•	 A data processing, analysis and evaluation system which seeks to provide answers 
to the requirements that led to the tasking in the first place; 
•	 An information dissemination system which passes processed information to users 
or which allows users to interrogate data bases themselves to search for answers or 
amplifications to questions of particular importance;.
•	 A record keeping and storage system and
•	 A security system that serves as a system boundary.
Figure 1. Elements of a Situational Awareness System
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Figure 1 captures the essence of the system. Like all models, it is a simplification 
of the real world. Although the cycle would, in a perfect world, start with the 
requirements setting and tasking authority, it can begin at any point. Also the arrows 
suggest a continuous, sequential process. This is not always how things actually work. 
For example, the collection system may bring to light information about unexpected 
activities that had not been predicted or sought by the tasking authority. Or an 
analyst, trawling through records, may discover a pattern that leads to a new 
interpretation about a series of events that warrants further examination of both 
old records and through new collection. More formally, there are feedback loops 
between each element of the system that can short circuit the ideal flow implied 
by the model.
A further point is that many situational awareness systems are ‘virtual’ in the sense 
that no single agency or authority owns or is responsible for all elements of the 
system. This is certainly the case with the Australian MDA system. The Australian 
Government has overarching responsibility but particular functions and capabilities 
are spread amongst various departments and agencies, each with their own 
charters, imperatives, aspirations and limitations. They are at once competitors and 
collaborators. They compete for political influence and funds, in an increasingly 
contested funding environment. They collaborate to the extent necessary to gain 
benefit from the system, as a whole, and to demonstrate the value of the contribution 
they make to the overall system. Some operate under strict legal and other 
restrictions, including for example privacy laws and security agreements with third 
parties, which sometimes limit the amount and type of data they may share with 
others. Beyond the Commonwealth the States and Territories both contribute to and 
take from the system as do companies with interests in the maritime domain.
The model, as represented by the diagram, does not fully account for the dynamic 
nature of activities undertaken. Three dimensions beyond the diagram which need 
further explanation are (1) time (leads and lags in the system), (2) the organisational 
and personal biases inherent in the system and (3) response activities that are 
initiated as a result of information provided by the system to relevant authorities. 
Time: Leads and Lags
Time is needed to acquire new capabilities in response to new information 
requirements or simply to replace existing collection capabilities that come to the 
end of their operational lives. Some capabilities in the system take much longer to 
acquire than others. This is not just a question of technology platforms, sensors, 
supercomputers and communications networks although the acquisition lead-time 
for some of these capabilities can be a decade or more. People with language skills 
and deep understanding of relevant cultures, also take years to educate and train and 
their skills are fungible meaning that continuous investment is needed to maintain 
their currency. Long lead times are generally acceptable in replacement or upgrade 
programs because the date by which time the new capability is needed can usually be 
anticipated and planned for. An important proviso is that replacement and upgrade 
projects are not delayed for budgetary or other reasons to such an extent that future 
capability and operational effectiveness is compromised.
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Furthermore investments need to be balanced across the system in order that 
bottlenecks are avoided. There is little point for example, in having access to satellite 
data if the ground reception station has not been built, or the data storage and 
processing system has not been upgraded to meet new demands or the analysts 
have not been recruited and trained to make best use of the data source now at their 
disposal. Such disconnects happen all too frequently meaning that optimal system 
performance is at best delayed and sometimes only achieved at additional cost.
Organisational and Personal Interests and Biases
Analyses of capabilities and processes such as those discussed in this paper often 
proceed on the basis that nations act in their rational self-interest following a process 
that involves the systematic collection of evidence and its dispassionate analysis in 
which costs and risks are carefully weighed. In his classic account of the Cuba Missile 
Crisis, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison called this the “rational actor” model. It 
remains the common denominator for much discourse in international relations.10 A 
hallmark of the “rational actor” model is that nation states tend to be personified in the 
literature: “China did this, and Malaysia did that”, as if these two nations were people. 
Such simplification is a useful shorthand providing its limitations are acknowledged 
and understood. 
Allison postulated two further models to explain the behaviour of both the United 
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the crisis. He called 
these the “organisational process” model and the “governmental process” model. For 
simplicity he numbered the models “I”, “II”, and “III”. 
In the world that Alison wrote about information flowed 
through the formal and informal centres of power and 
authority in organisations in a more or less linear and 
predictable fashion. Information was a scarce commodity and 
there was a nexus between information and power. One of 
Alison’s key points was that key American actors in the crisis 
had disparate goals and measures of success that could not 
be accommodated in any analysis of the crisis that referred to 
the rational actor model alone.
This comment applies equally to Australia’s approach to 
situational awareness in its maritime domains which is 
also not capable of being explained by reference only to 
behaviour that Alison’s rational actor model might describe 
and predict. There are important organisational and political influences (Alison’s 
Models II and III) to be taken into account as well. 
Another way of illustrating the relationships between elements of a situational 
awareness system is to emphasise sequence and flow. Figure 2, uses the Australian 
MDA system as an example, to illustrate these relationships. As with the model outlined 
in Figure 1, there is implicit order and logic. However general system attributes or 
functions have been replaced by concrete words to describe how MDA is achieved and 
by whom.
10  Allison G T, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little Brown, Boston, 1971 
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Figure 2. One representation of the Australian MDA System
This seemingly well-ordered world has been fundamentally changed by the 
invention, rapid and ubiquitous adoption of the internet and associated technologies. 
When Allison wrote Essence of Decision, the internet did not exist. Since the 1980s 
internetworking technologies have transformed the way in which information is 
collected, processed, exploited, disseminated and stored. Networking technologies 
enable information to flow more or less simultaneously up down and across 
organisations making checks and balances that applied in the past far more difficult 
to apply. More profoundly, the world moved, in general terms, from one of information 
scarcity to one of information glut. There are certainly times when, with respect to 
a specific situation or circumstance, decision makers are frustrated by insufficient 
information. However, current fusion systems assume that data from numerous 
sources is plentiful and needs to be winnowed to be of use to decision makers.
All organisations, large and small, for profit and not-for-profit and public institutions, 
including government departments and agencies, are struggling to harness the 
potential of the internet whilst also maintaining some measure of control of the 
information that enters and leaves these organisations. The transformation in the way 
information flows today is illustrated below. Everything can be, and often is, connected 
to everything else. But the real complexity arises from the fact that these connections 
are dynamic; they are no longer static. They come and go in myriad combinations 
and permutations to satisfy requirements which also rise and fall in the attention they 
demand and the priority they are given.
Figure three is a schematic that seeks to demonstrate visually the complexity of just 
the “collection” node of Figure 1 or the “finding out” element of Figure 2. The COP 
is the technological response to reduce to complexity of the data generated in the 
networked system to a point that humans may have some hope of comprehending 
what the data is telling them in order that reasoned responses may be taken.
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Figure 3. An MDA Collection Network
Collection is one of the steps in the MDA process. Eight generic information sources 
in the example above, give rise to the possibility of 28 two-way connections any 
combination and permutation of which may be active at any given time. The Common 
Operating Picture (COP), is the principal means by which decision-makers attempt to 
stay on top of the flood of data that is now available. It helps them make sense of the 
information at their disposal and to contextualise it for their own purposes.
Policies, practices and cultures are fundamentally challenged by the 
transformational nature of the internet. The ‘need to know’ principle is being 
displaced by a ‘need-to-share’ principle of which the COP is an important reflection. 
This fundamental shift is not without risk, especially from disaffected ‘insiders’, such 
as Edward Snowden. His release into the public domain of documents that he stole 
from the National Security Agency (NSA) have caused significant harm to the United 
States and its allies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of diplomacy 
and military operations. His revelations have sparked an important debate about 
the privacy protections to be afforded citizens in a networked world in which any 
information passed over the internet, in technical terms at least, is accessible to any 
determined observer. 
Data fed into a COP is similarly vulnerable and new balances between operational 
necessity and security and the ‘need to know’ and the ‘need to share’, are evolving at 
all levels of activity. This is discussed below in the section that addresses tasking and 
requirements setting.
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In the 1980s, the ICT revolution began to transform all human activities, including those 
concerned with maritime domain awareness. No longer is it sensible or sufficient 
to invest in platforms and sensors alone. Data processing, storage, retrieval and 
dissemination systems need to be capable of handling the data provided by sensors in 
order that best use can be made of the information that has been collected. There are 
at least three corollaries.
•	 Ensure that data, irrespective of source, is not left unprocessed and analysed for 
want of appropriate investment in backend systems.
•	 Where possible automate data flows, analysis and dissemination – save time, 
reduce errors and release staff for higher order tasks where judgement is essential.
•	 Minimise, to the extent possible, the amount of data in the system that is classified.
These considerations drive a systems approach to maritime domain awareness which 
accounts for every element of the system being connected to every other element. The 
power of the system, including its resilience and redundancy is in the network.
Response Activities
A constant challenge for capability developers and systems designers is to achieve an 
optimum balance between those elements of the system that are devoted exclusively 
or substantially to observation, analysis and prediction and to those elements that can 
respond to a developing situation. For many years the Commonwealth has invested 
in ships and aircraft that can perform both functions and has avoided investing in 
sovereign capabilities that can observe but not respond. Earth observation satellites 
are an obvious example of capabilities that can only observe. Australia owns and 
operates none of these systems, preferring instead to gain access to data from 
foreign-owned and operated satellites through a variety of government to government 
and standard commercial arrangements. 
As noted already the Government has announced its intention to purchase a number 
(possibly seven or eight) MQ-4C Triton High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAVs 
later in the decade. These aircraft, to be operated by the RAAF are surveillance and 
relay communications platforms with no capacity to directly respond to any event in 
Australia’s maritime domains that warrants physical presence. This is the first time 
that Australia has invested in dedicated platforms, optimised for maritime ISR, that 
have no inherent response capability at all. 
Manned aircraft, operating at lower altitudes than typically will the Triton, can provide 
a deterrent effect simply by being seen. They can also drop life-rafts and other 
aids and, in extreme circumstances, launch weapons. Ships and patrol vessels have 
boarding parties that may help to thwart people-smuggling operations or to regulate 
the activities of Foreign Fishing Vessels (FFV) in Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). They can and do assist in recovery operations associated with natural disasters 
and, in extremis, they can launch weapons.
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Acquisition of the Tritons will provide decision-makers with the capability for persistent 
ISR in maritime and littoral areas of particular interest. They will have application 
and relevance at all levels of activity – the tactical, operational and strategic – in 
the governance of Australia’s maritime domains. They also offer an opportunity to 
Australian tasking authorities to acquire the experience and 
confidence needed to task Earth observation satellites that, 
at some point in the future, may be acquired and operated 
by Australia in order to meet specific national requirements 
that the foreign-owners and operators of satellites on which 
Australia is completely dependent today cannot or will 
choose to not meet. Unlike the Tritons, which are confined 
to operating in national or international airspace unless 
granted specific permission to enter the sovereign airspace 
of other nations, satellites have no such restrictions. The laws 
of physics and orbital mechanics mean that they overfly 
otherwise denied areas with impunity. 
Tasking and Requirements Setting: Strategic, Operational and 
Tactical Perspectives
This section of the paper provides examples that are intended to highlight some 
of the dilemmas and challenges inherent in creating and maintaining a maritime 
COP. The MDA system must serve multiple users simultaneously. They have different 
priorities and time imperatives and they seek information at different levels of detail 
or granularity. Some information requirements can be satisfied from local sources 
whilst others require inputs, via the COP, from external providers. Invariably, there 
are more requirements than there are capabilities to meet them all so negotiation 
skills becomes vitally important if decision makers at all levels are to have their most 
important priorities met. 
The conventional military distinctions between the tactical, operational and strategic 
levels of activity is used to demonstrate how complex requirements can become and 
how information from all levels is needed and can be used by others. The tactical/
operational/strategic schema applies equally well to civilian MDA activities as it does 
to military activities.
Tactical Level
A ship’s captain is vitally interested in the environment in the immediate vicinity of his 
or her ship. On board sensors include radars, sonars (active and passive), electronic 
monitoring equipment (basically radio receivers), and the eyes of the crew who 
routinely scan the horizon through binoculars. Information from these sensors feeds 
into a plot that might include the position, course and speed of other vessels that are 
nearby but out of visual range because they are obscured by weather or are below 
the horizon.
Some ships have helicopters which, when airborne, can extend the observation range 
of the ship from a few tens of kilometres to potentially hundreds of kilometres. 
Acquisition of the 
Tritons will provide 
decision-makers 
with the capability 
for persistent ISR in 
maritime and littoral 
areas of particular 
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Information from on board, or organic sensors, has two advantages over information 
from other sources. It is immediate and its veracity can be readily tested. The decision 
maker, typically the ship’s captain, when faced with information that is ambiguous or 
unclear, can immediately check the sensor and question the sensor operator. If doubt 
persists, the captain can factor this doubt into his or her decision as a calculated 
risk. He or she may decide to accept the risk and continue as planned or, as a 
precautionary measure, may take some other action such as altering the course and 
speed of the ship. A key point is that the information available to the captain, even if 
incomplete or ambiguous is trusted because its provenance is known.
In a networked world, some of the information gained by the organic sensors of the 
ship almost certainly will be transmitted to and shared with others. This information 
may add to the fidelity and comprehensiveness of the COP. However, care needs to be 
taken to ensure that the information provided is evaluated and correlated to overcome 
possible problems of duplication and timeliness.
Teasing this point out, there are times when ships (and aircraft too) seek to gain 
tactical advantage by not disclosing their presence. In such circumstances they may 
turn off their radars and radio transmitters so as not to emit signals that may be 
intercepted by an adversary or a third party. In such circumstances, when they do 
begin to transmit again, some information that they pass may have been overtaken 
by more recent information, from a different source or sources, about the same event. 
The main issues from the point of view of a COP are data latency and data matching, 
making sure that old news is not, in effect, re-circulated.
Tactical level decision-makers sometimes have extremely detailed information needs 
that can only be provided from external sources. For example, a RAN Patrol Boat 
may intercept a foreign fishing vessel (FFV) that is fishing without authorisation 
in Australian territorial waters. The FFV may be a new type, not seen before. The 
Patrol Boat captain might seek detailed plans of the FFV to maximise the situational 
awareness of the boarding party before the boarding takes place in an effort to 
minimise risks associated with this inherently hazardous activity. This might extend 
to knowing, in advance, in which direction particular bulkhead doors swing. If these 
drawings or plans are not held in a central repository such as an intelligence agency, 
the time taken to obtain them through industry contacts or foreign liaison channels 
may give the captain no choice but to proceed and accept risk he or she would prefer 
to have avoided.
Beyond having and valuing immediate situational awareness, the ship’s captain is 
also looking to the near future to understand the environment, in its broadest sense, 
into which his or her ship is sailing in the next few hours and days. The captain wants 
accurate weather forecasts from data derived by weather satellites and forwarded to 
the ship by shore-based radio or communications satellites. This translates to wind, 
cloud (fog) and sea state. The captain understands, incidentally, that the weather 
reports broadcast from his or her ship is fed into the predictive models that are also 
served by the satellites. The ship’s data provides ‘ground truth’ which enables the 
models and therefore the forecasts, to be refined. This information allows, for example, 
for routine maintenance to be planned and on-deck and below deck activities to be 
optimised from perspectives of safety and efficiency. 
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Operational Level
Decision makers at the operational level are typically responsible for the conduct of a 
broad set of functions within a usually quite large but still defined physical area. They 
have assigned resources, including people, and, in the case of the maritime domain, 
ships and aircraft that can perform ISR and response functions. Decision makers can 
direct these assets and conduct activities within their assigned area of responsibility 
in pursuit of the objectives set by higher levels of authority. In addition to these 
capabilities that they can task directly, they may also request access to additional 
capabilities, for specified purposes, from a higher level of organisational authority. 
Operational level decision-makers, for example with civil maritime border protection 
responsibilities, have access to relevant intelligence from national agencies and often 
have responsibilities for coordinating activities between numerous departments and 
agencies in Australia including defence, law enforcement, immigration, quarantine 
authorities and relevant State, Territory and local governments. 
Operational level decision makers may also have limited international liaison 
responsibilities on matters of direct concern to their assigned tasks. 
Australia is one of a handful of middle powers with capacity 
and experience in planning and conducting civil and military 
operations at the operational level. At the heart of these 
activities is a command support system that gives decision 
makers the confidence and skill to plan and direct the activities 
of people and platforms from various organisations, sometimes 
from several nations. Military parlance for these activities is joint 
and combined operations. However, in the MDA context, there 
are important civil and commercial contributors to be taken into 
account as well. This capability was clearly evident in Australia’s 
leadership of the operation to locate the final resting place of 
the missing Malaysian airliner, flight MH370. The early weeks 
of the search, which focussed on detecting debris from the aircraft that may have been 
still floating on the ocean surface presented special challenges because operational, 
safety, and public information considerations needed to be carefully managed to not 
exacerbate the stress on affected families, the emotionally charged media coverage 
and the evident strains, especially in China’s bilateral relationship with Malaysia.
Australia set out to acquire the skills needed to conduct activities at the operational level 
in the 1980s, initially through re-structuring the command and control arrangements of 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and later through the creation of Border Protection 
Command, now the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS). This has 
been a thirty year journey. Some important milestones and initiatives include:
•	 The establishment of the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1986 to build a sense 
of common purpose and deep friendships and trust between officers of the three 
Services as their careers progressed from their days as cadets.
•	 A series of Defence ICT projects designed to create a joint command support 
environment and a joint intelligence support environment that started in the 1990s 
and continue to this day. 
•	 The establishment of Headquarters Northern Command (HQNORCOM) in 1988
•	 The establishment of Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) in 1996 which 
morphed into Headquarters Joint Operations Command in 2004 and which is now 
located in purpose built facilities near Bungendore NSW.
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•	 The withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Timor Leste and their replacement by an 
Australian led multinational force in 2006 which paved the way for elections and 
Timor’s transition to independence.
•	 The experience gained by commanders, units and crews in a decade of war and 
war-like operations in the Middle East (Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea and 
the Indian Ocean littoral.
•	 The establishment of Border Protection Command in 2005 which morphed into the 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service in 2009.
•	 Operation Ache Assist, the civil and humanitarian relief operation that followed the 
Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004.
•	 Operation Sovereign Borders and its predecessors which were designed to counter 
people smuggling operations usually from Indonesia. Although politically contentious, 
at the operational level, close civil/military cooperation became the norm.
•	 Most recently, the multi-national search operation to find the missing Malaysian 
airliner, flight MH370. The flight was bound from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on 
8 March 2014 but, in circumstances that remain a mystery, the plane set an entirely 
different course and seems to have crashed into the Indian Ocean 1,500km west of 
Perth, WA killing all 239 people on board. The search effort was initially coordinated 
by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. However, its increasing complexity in 
operational, diplomatic and political terms, saw overall responsibility being vested 
in Air Chief Marshal (retired) Angus Houston AC. His knowledge of the operational 
environment, his extensive command experience, his understanding of the domestic 
political environment and his friendships throughout the region are a text book case 
of MDA at its most sophisticated and best.
Strategic Level
In 2007, Rod Lyon from the Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI) produced a paper 
called Australia’s Strategic Fundamentals in which he identified three schools of strategic 
thought which have been prevalent in Australian strategic thinking since the 19th Century.11 
Lyon named the three schools as ‘Globalists’, ‘Regionalists’ and ‘Continentalists’.
‘Globalists’ have argued that Australian security is essentially determined 
by the global order, that the global order is critically determined by events 
distant from Australia, and that our strategic policy therefore should be an 
extroverted one. ‘Regionalists’ have argued that Australia needs to come 
to terms with its Asia–Pacific strategic environment, that Britain’s ‘far east’ 
was always our ‘near north’, and that Australia should build security with 
Asia rather than from it. ‘Continentalists’ have argued that the defence of 
Australia must be the primary focus of the ADF, that Australia’s defence 
problems are unique, and that we should build a defence force which 
maximises our ability to protect the continent by exploiting the sea-air gap 
to our immediate north.
11  Lyon, R., Australia’s Strategic Fundamentals, Special Report, No 6, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
June 2007.
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Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin in another ASPI paper asked whether Australia 
and Australians regard the oceans as a moat that keeps others out or as bridge that 
permits relationships to be built and friendships to flourish. 
How governments, and the nation as a whole, balance globalist, regionalist and 
continentalist perspectives and resolve the question of moat or bridge has profound 
implications for economic development, military force posture and force structure and 
priorities for Australia’s foreign relations and diplomacy. Understanding the maritime 
domains is integral to their governance. Activities as diverse as environmental 
management and sea control can only proceed on a basis of deep knowledge 
and understanding, which permits operational and new capability priorities to be 
established and realised. 
As noted earlier, Australia’s national security posture is built on the bed rock of the 
US alliance. This situation is not likely to change any time soon. Both sides of politics 
in Australia embrace the alliance and there is strong support for the alliance from the 
wider electorate. Some commentators have started to argue 
that Australia needs to develop an international and regional 
persona that is somewhat more independent and less evidently 
tied to the US than is the case today. These views are driven 
by the rise of China and a perception in some quarters, the 
rhetoric of the “re-balance” notwithstanding, that US power in 
the Asia Pacific is waning in relative and absolute terms. 
The future level of US commitment to the Asia Pacific region has fundamental 
implications for the Australian MDA system. If more information from US sources is shared 
with Australia, there is potentially less that Australia has to collect for itself. Alternatively, 
and taking a more sophisticated view, Australian collection systems will be freed for tasks 
that otherwise might not have been possible to perform. This provides, in principle, for 
a richer MDA system for Australia and also provides Australian officials with information 
that is unique and that can be shared or traded with others to mutual benefit. 
Regardless of whether particular governments are ‘Globalist’, ‘Regionalist’ or 
‘Continentalist’, there would seem to be an array of data relevant to Australia’s 
maritime domains which would provide baseline information to inform policies and 
response options at the strategic level. 
There is other data that is strategy dependent. For example, if Australia is at all 
serious about conducting routine submarine operations in the South China Sea and 
the Western Pacific deep understanding of these ocean environments, from a physical 
perspective and in terms of human activities, will be an essential element of overall 
capability. If, however, Australian strategy were to focus primarily on the defence 
of the Sea-Air gap to the immediate north and northwest of the continent, different 
requirements and ways of meeting those requirements can be contemplated.
The strategic level of activity involves questions of national priorities and resource 
allocation. The Commonwealth does not invest in MDA per se. Rather MDA is achieved 
through investments in the armed forces, intelligence, border protection, law 
enforcement, diplomacy and scientific research. The sum of the information that 
comes from these sources, when aggregated, compared, fused, and disseminated 
provides the COP from which policy makers and response agencies can derive MDA.
The next section of this paper discusses the principal sensor systems and other data 
collection methods that are used by Australia to develop the COP.
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COLLECTION SYSTEMS USED BY AUSTRALIA
The Australian Government gathers data from numerous sources to develop its 
maritime COP. Some decisions about next generation sensor systems to provide 
situational awareness in Australia’s maritime domains have been made in the 
past year and the Defence White Paper of 2015 may point the way to further new 
investments as well. 
This is no simple task and investment balances will need to be struck between:
•	 Sensor Types and the platforms on which they are mounted;
•	 The Front and Back end of sensor systems;
•	 Sensor Systems, Weapons Systems and Hybrids;
•	 Intelligence and Statecraft (diplomacy and human contact) and Surveillance 
Technologies (remote sensing of all types);
•	 ‘Big Data’ Analytics and Remote Sensing Systems;
•	 Self-protection systems and area sensors; and
•	 Single use (usually military) and ‘dual use’ systems where the one system is tasked 
by and provides data to both national security and civil users.
There are also questions of how to ensure that legacy systems are integrated with new 
capabilities as they come on line. 
Sensors that can provide data relevant to situational awareness in the maritime 
domain may be located in space, on aircraft (manned and unmanned), on land, such 
as the Jindalee Over-The-Horizon Radar Network (JORN), on ships and other surface 
craft, on submarines and other submersibles. Sensors may be active, such as radars 
and active sonars; these systems send out a signal and listen for the return pulse. Or, 
they may be passive; such as visual light and infra-red sensors and signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) systems that can intercept radio and radar emissions and extract useful 
information from them. 
Each of these systems has advantages and disadvantages. Radar systems on satellites 
or aircraft can ‘see’ through cloud and can detect objects such as ships in tropical 
areas where there is often cloud cover. However, radar emissions can be detected 
which discloses the presence and possibly the location of their source to an adversary, 
thereby allowing him to mount an attack or to avoid being attacked. 
Sensors and other sources are layered and controlled by various agencies. Table 
1 is an inventory of collection systems that provide inputs to Australia’s maritime 
situational awareness system. The table does not set out to be definitive. Its purpose 
is to demonstrate the complexity of the system and by inference to indicate the 
enormous challenges to be overcome if optimal capability balances are to be achieved 
across the system.
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Table 1. Collection systems used to gain situational awareness in the maritime domain.
Source Ownership/Control Main first line users
Earth observation satellites 
Two broad types:
passive working in 
the electro-optic, 
infra-red and various 
radio emission bands 
and active radar 
satellites which 
transmit pulses to 
Earth the reflected 
energy of which 
is used to gain 
information
All foreign owned Bureau of Meteorology
Geoscience Australia (GA)
Mainly civil agencies such as 
NASA, NOAA, ESA and JAXA which 
provide free-to-ground data 
under a range of international 
and bilateral agreements
State and territory land and 
property management agencies
Research agencies, notably 
CSIRO, and universities
Various US national security 
agencies for data provided for 
surveillance and intelligence 
gathering purposes
Australian Geospatial Intelligence 
Organisation (AGO) and other 
components of the Australian 
Intelligence Community
Commercially owned and 
operated
Government purchases 
increasingly channelled through 
a panel, hosted by GA
Aircraft
Long haul Routine 
Passenger Transport 
(RPT)
Foreign and Australian carriers, 
reporting data relevant to 
weather reporting and prediction
BoM - routine reporting – data 
points to improve the fidelity of 
predictive models
Government owned 
and leased aircraft
RAAF, ACBPS, AMSA and other 
agencies, surveillance and 
reconnaissance of human 
activities using radars, ELINT and 
line of sight visual and IR sensors
Helicopters for SAR
Government control and tasking 
authorities to understand 
normalcy states and to detect 
and respond especially to 
non-cooperative targets or to 
targets displaying unusual or 
uncharacteristic behaviour
Research 
organisations
Oceanography Hydrography
Research organisation owned 
or commercial leases to support 
particular research projects
eg. Laser Airborne Depth 
Sounding (LADS)
Nominated Principal 
Investigators
Surface Ships
Government ships RAN, ACBPS, State and Territory 
police and other agencies for in-
shore work
Government control and tasking 
authorities for sea control, 
exercises and border protection 
duties – often engaged in 
incident response and rescue
RAN hydrography Marine charting
Two ocean-going 
ships (one ice 
capable) and smaller, 
inshore, vessels
CSIRO and Antarctic Division Nominated Principal 
Investigators for research
Smaller, inshore, 
vessels
Other Commonwealth 
departments and agencies, State 
and Territory governments – 
eg. port authorities and police
Commercial ships Commercially owned and 
operated
Position and related reporting 
IAW maritime regulations to port, 
safety and other Government 
agencies
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Source Ownership/Control Main first line users
Submersibles
Submarines RAN Government control and tasking
Ship towed arrays RAN mainly for tactical ASW 
purposes ie. submarine detection 
(data may feed to higher 
agencies)
Ships commanders
Principal researcher
Fixed arrays Allied navies (for submarine and 
ship detection)
Intelligence and tasking 
authorities
Robots Various research organisations Nominated Principal 
Investigators for research
Intelligence
Government agencies Intelligence agencies, then 
passed to operational 
users almost exclusively at 
Commonwealth Government 
level
Radar
Surveillance, weather RAAF, Jindalee Over-the-horizon 
Radar Network (JORN)
Government control and tasking
Ships radars for local situational 
awareness (may be networked 
for over-the-horizon situational 
awareness and data may feed to 
higher agencies)
Ship commanders
Other Sensors
Ocean Buoys CSIRO ocean conditions below 
and at the surface, currents, 
weather
Nominated Principal 
Investigators for research
Hand held 
imagery and visual 
observation
Port authorities, ACBPS, law 
enforcement agencies
Security officials, criminal 
investigators
The table illustrate the variety of sensor/platform combinations that collect data for 
many government and other purposes. There are both overlaps and gaps. Coverage 
for many purposes and applications does not need to be continuous. For others tasks, 
continuity and persistence is imperative. 
Some quantitative factors that must be considered include the following.
•	 Time: Most sensors are not available continuously to cover any given area. This 
is not necessarily a problem but tasking authorities, having determined their 
information requirements, need to think carefully about the frequency of coverage 
necessary to understand and, if necessary regulate, a particular area or activity. 
This directly impacts the tasking of platforms of all types on which the sensors 
are fitted and also has an important capability impact in terms of the numbers of 
platforms of various types that are needed to perform various missions.
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•	 Resolution: For some purposes, knowledge of the mere presence (or absence) of 
some particular activity is sufficient for operational authorities. At other times, high 
resolution imagery is needed, together with a competent operator, to establish a 
chain of evidence for later presentation in court. There are also many ‘in-between’ 
cases where some information, regardless of the sensor, used is better than none.
Three terms relevant to surveillance systems that look for human objects such 
as ships and aircraft and that are fundamentally dependent on resolution are 
“detection”, “classification” and “identification”. Detection simply denotes the 
presence of an object in space and time. Classification, refers to the type of object 
that has been detected (eg. an oil tanker or a war ship). Identification implies that 
the system has been able to put a name to the object detected (HMAS Sirius or the 
bulk coal ship Brilliant Century). 
•	 Spectral Response: Sensors that operate in different frequency bands reveal 
different information or work better at some times than at other times. Infra-red 
sensors detect heat and heat signatures that can assist in the identification of 
ships, by type, class and sometimes even by name or pennant number. Many visual 
light sensors can only operate in daylight hours unless artificial illumination (eg 
flares) is provided. Low light sensors are used at night but typically have a limited 
field of view. Infra-red sensors can operate in darkness and most radars operate 
as well at night as they do in the day. An important limitation of the JORN system 
is the so-called dawn and dusk ‘terminator’. JORN depends on the presence of a 
stable ionosphere. However at dawn and dusk the ionosphere changes its structure 
and can even disappear. A corollary is that the JORN system has a sophisticated 
ionospheric sensing and modelling system build into the operating system of the 
radar to assist operators to use the radar as effectively and efficiently as possible 
over the course of the day.
•	 Ground Truth A great deal of data about Australia’s maritime domains come from 
satellites. The value of this information is considerably enhanced when the results 
of observations made from space can be calibrated with measurements made in 
situ, including from known locations at known times on the surface and under the 
sea. Ground truth in the present context is provided typically by ocean buoys and 
measurements taken by ships and aircraft. 
•	 Calibration and Validation (CALVAL) A corollary of Ground Truth is CALVAL. Sensors 
on satellites cannot be regularly maintained and calibrated by technicians on the 
ground. Instead their sensitivity, which changes over time (they tend to become less 
sensitive), needs to be regularly measured in order that the data being relayed to 
Earth can be adjusted to account for the sensitivity of the sensor at the time that 
an image was made. CALVAL is the process by which targets with precisely known 
absorption and reflectance characteristics are regularly imaged and the results 
that are provided can be checked against the theoretical norm. Any variance can 
then be applied to other observations by the same sensor leading to more accurate 
results overall. Australia hosts a number of CALVAL sites that are used by other 
nations to support their Earth observation satellite programs. 
Tasking authorities need to understand in great detail the operational strengths and 
limitations of the platforms on which sensors are mounted as well as understanding 
the characteristics of the sensors themselves. More than this, they need to understand 
the broader system impacts of tasking one platform/sensor combination over another, 
assuming that choice exists.
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The following sections discuss in more detail some of the strengths and limitations of 
different sensor systems with specific reference to the Australian situation. 
Aerial Systems: Manned and Unmanned Aircraft
Several Australian Government departments and agencies use manned aircraft in 
support of their maritime patrol and response missions. The RAAF has a fleet of 19 
aging AP-3C aircraft. The ACBPS uses commercial contractors to provide civil maritime 
patrol operations using Dash-8 aircraft and helicopters (the latter mainly in the 
Torres Strait) and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) operates a fleet of 
five Dornier aircraft positioned at each of the four corners of the continent that are 
capable of performing Search and Rescue operations close to the coast.
The Dash-8s shoulder the lions’ share of the task, in the order of 90%, in terms of 
flying hours and area covered. In recent years they have focussed their efforts on the 
Christmas Island to Darwin corridor to detect and assist in the apprehension of boats 
carrying asylum seekers. 
As well as their commitments in the Middle East, including missions over the Arabian 
Gulf, anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and support to land operation in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, RAAF AP-3C aircraft have made a substantial contribution to border 
protection operations. These activities have come at a cost. The RAAF has lost skills in 
maritime strike and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The latter is of particular concern 
as Australia moves to acquire a fleet of new submarines. Airborne ASW is an essential 
element of undersea warfare and this capability will need to be re-built in coming 
years. 
The AP3-C fleet is due to be replaced in the next five years under Defence project 
AIR 7000. The plan is to acquire a mix of eight manned and up to seven unmanned 
platforms. The manned aircraft will be the Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft which is 
based on the Boeing 737 commercial airliner. The Australian Government has already 
announced that it will purchase eight of these aircraft and has an option to purchase 
at least four more. The P-8A, “promises higher cruise speeds, higher maximum 
altitudes, significantly longer range, and a longer time on station compared to the 
P-3”.12 It will also be capable of carrying and delivering weapons and have an air-to-air 
refuelling capability. 
As noted earlier the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton has been named by the 
government as its preferred HALE UAS. The Triton is a version of the Global Hawk 
aircraft that has been modified specifically for long endurance operations over 
water. Both the P-8A and the MQ-4C aircraft will have the ability to collect massive 
volumes of data which, even with automated processing, will present challenges to 
information systems and to human analysts. Both platforms will be reliant on access 
to communications satellites as the prime means by which data will be transferred to 
other units and to processing centres on land. A safe and secure space environment 
and assured access to communications satellites are essential enabling capabilities for 
both aircraft.
12  Hollins, K. Blue water birds: Transitioning from the AP-3C to the P-8 and a UAS, in Australian Defence 
Business Review, March 2013, Canberra, p14.
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If fiscal constraints slow the introduction into service of both the P-8A and the Triton 
especially, the RAAF could be faced with the problem of having to maintain three 
aircraft types (AP3-C, P-8A and Triton) for a period. This will add strains to the 
workforce and slow the acquisition of knowledge and experience that will be critically 
important if the best is to be obtained from the new systems not only as they relate to 
each other but as they dovetail with other new capabilities including the F-18 Growler, 
the F-35 Lightning and the range extension potentials offered by air-to-air refuelling.
The RAAF has gained experience in operating UAVs in Afghanistan and has paid 
considerable attention to the practicalities of operating a mixed fleet of manned and 
unmanned platforms in future to achieve optimal outcomes.
The ACBPS presently depends on a fleet of Dash-8 aircraft, 
to meet most of its civil maritime surveillance requirements. 
The Dash-8s and crews are provided by an Adelaide-based 
company, Cobham Australia. The Dash-8s are a capable 
aircraft with a sophisticated suite of visual, thermal and 
electronic sensors. They may be expected to complement the 
P-8A and the MQ-4C. In particular the Dash-8s, once released 
of some of their longer range duties, should be able to 
increase the density of patrol activities in areas of particular 
interest and in doing so to increase levels of presence 
and deterrence. 
Successive Governments have favoured fixed wing aircraft as the preferred 
primary platforms for maritime surveillance. Tasking authorities and operators are 
comfortable with these systems; they know their strengths and limitations. Aircraft 
have been seen to represent lower risks than some postulated alternatives, including 
balloon-based and space-based systems. Aircraft have the additional advantage 
of being unambiguously under sovereign control and, critically, they are seen as 
being extremely responsive and flexible. The likelihood that manned aircraft will 
be displaced as the workhorses that provide situational awareness in the Australian 
maritime domain, even in constrained fiscal times, is considered to be remote.
Space
Although Australia does not own or operate any Earth observation satellites of its own 
it is a sophisticated user of satellite systems for communications, Earth observation 
and position, timing and navigation. These uses and the associated dependencies 
have not been as well-recognised in the past by policy makers and the broader 
public alike. There is evidence, however that this situation is changing. Space attracts 
increasing attention in Defence White Papers and associated documents and in April 
2013 Australia released its first national space policy (called formally a National Space 
Utilisation Policy to dampen any expectation that Australia is about to invest in human 
space flight or space exploration missions).
Satellites monitor the environment in broad terms, including phenomena such as sea 
surface temperature, ocean colour, cloud formations and soil moisture to enhance 
weather prediction and to improve climate modelling and agricultural practices. They 
provide synoptic cover of major natural events such as floods, fires and the impact 
of tsunamis. They search for the signs of ballistic missile launches to provide early 
warning. They listen for radio and radar emissions which can disclose the presence, 
location and identity of ships and aircraft. They make increasingly fine grain images 
such as those which may accessed through applications such as Google Earth. 
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A distinct advantage of satellites is that they operate without the need for permission 
above the territory of any sovereign nation. This is a function of the laws of physics as 
they apply to objects that orbit Earth. American satellites can look into the backyards 
of China and Russia just as the satellites of these two nations can and do observe 
activities in the United States
Except for satellites in GEO, which can provide persistent coverage of a large area 
of Earth, the rest come and go, relative to an observer on Earth, at regular and 
predictable intervals which may be days or even weeks apart. The implications from 
the operational perspective of a surveillance system are three fold:
•	 An informed entity which seeks to conceal activity from being observed by any 
given satellite knows when to cease activity at a given site to give an impression 
that activity is not taking place;
•	 The same observer may incorporate the predictability of satellite passes in 
deception operations that seek to influence the behaviour of a competitor or 
adversary more broadly than simply concealing immediate activities; and
•	 Earth observation satellites in LEO especially, which includes all high resolution 
imaging satellites, are not persistent and their effectiveness may be further 
reduced by cloud cover and other phenomena which prevent targets of interest 
being seen and imaged from space. 
Australia’s Use of Satellites for Situational Awareness in the 
Maritime Domain
Australia makes considerable use of satellite data to understand its maritime 
domains. Use of communications satellites, including commercial leases, and use of 
the US funded and maintained Global Positioning System (GPS) is basically taken 
for granted. The departments and agencies that make most use of data from remote 
sensing satellites are discussed below together with some current concerns and plans 
for remediation.
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) depends heavily on data from a number of weather 
satellites that provide data “free to ground” under international agreements to the 
BoM. The Bureau maintains a series of satellite ground stations which receive the 
data from the satellites and pass it into the ground processing system, notably a very 
large supercomputer in Canberra. The data is fed into various models which allows 
predictions to be made with increasing levels of accuracy and confidence. In recent 
years the BoM has been able to extend the early warning period of heat waves and 
other extreme weather from hours to days, in no small measure because of its ability 
to integrate satellite data with other observations more precisely and more quickly. 
These advanced warnings are also issued with unprecedented confidence due to the 
fidelity of the data and the increasing sophistication and reliability of the models.
A substantial element of Australia’s aid program is allocated to the provision of 
weather services and climate information to regional neighbours.
Ground truth and complementary data is provided by the observations of ships and 
aircraft, automatic weather stations on isolated reefs and coasts, and tethered and 
floating buoys such as those in the CSIRO-led Argo program. Data from these remote 
sensors is passed, often by communications satellites, back to the BoM to further 
enrich the models and refine the predictions.
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Geoscience Australia (GA) GA’s formal contribution to Australia’s understanding 
of its maritime domains extends to the coastal margins of the Australian mainland 
as well as the island territories. In 2011, GA published a report Continuity of Earth 
Observation Data for Australia: Operational Requirements to 2015 for Lands, Coasts 
and Oceans13. The report painted described the extent of Australia’s dependence on 
data provided by Earth observation satellites and pointed also to fragilities in the 
current arrangements. Quite a few satellites on which Australia depends are due to 
end their operational lives in the next few years and not all are being replaced leaving 
potentially large gaps in data that Australia has come to rely upon over many years.
A companion to the Geoscience Australia report was released by CSIRO in January 
2012. The report called Continuity of Earth Observation Data for Australia: Research 
and Development dependencies to 2020, outlined the diverse uses to which Earth 
observation data from space is put by Australian researchers.14 It noted the growing 
opportunities that exist for international research cooperation and it reinforced the 
seventh finding in the GA report that emerging gaps of greatest concern are medium 
resolution electro-optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) data. 
The next generation of Earth observation satellites will 
generate substantially more data than those currently in 
operation. Earth stations will need to be upgraded from 
narrowband to broadband receiver, processing and storage 
systems. The Commonwealth has plans to upgrade existing 
ground infrastructure to cope with the additional data 
from next generation Earth observation and GNSS systems 
focussing on civil applications. 
In summary, relevant Australian Government departments 
and agencies, in concert, are taking small but practical steps 
to ensure continuity of Earth observation data from space for a range of environmental 
monitoring tasks for both operational and research purposes. These investments will 
allow data to be gathered about Australia’s coastal areas and surrounding oceans and 
may be expected to inform future policy decisions, and the operations of protection 
and response agencies.
Some observers are critical of Australia for not having its own remote sensing 
satellites. They argue that because the nation lacks the ability to obtain images 
without reference to others it is exposed to an unacceptable level of sovereign risk. 
A more compelling and sophisticated argument is that without data sources of its 
own, Australia lacks the ability to trade Earth observation data with others. In the 
past Australia, in effect, has traded real estate (hosting of ground stations) for access 
to data. The model has served Australia well in the past but its future utility is less 
certain. As more nations operate their own satellites they seek to share data on a 
quid pro quo basis. Presently, Australia has nothing to trade. It is not hard to imagine 
that this may have been a problem in the context of the early days of the search for 
MH-370 in the Indian Ocean. 
13  Geoscience Australia, Continuity of Earth Observation Data for Australia: Operational Requirements 
to 2015 for Lands, Coasts and Oceans, Canberra, 2011.
14  CSIRO, Continuity of Earth Observation Data for Australia: Research and Development dependencies 
to 2020, Canberra, 2012.
The next generation 
of Earth observation 
satellites will 
generate 
substantially more 
data than those 
currently in operation.
54 KOKODA FOUNDATION   |   KOKODA PAPER NO. 20
Satellite Remote Sensing in Support of ACBPS Operations
The ACBPS makes use of satellites to monitor shipping movements in two basic 
ways. Increasing use is being made of the Automated Identification System (AIS) for 
cooperative targets. In addition, radar satellites are used to monitor activity in the 
fishing grounds around Heard Island and McDonald Island in the southern Indian Ocean 
in an effort to deter and prevent illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone around 
these two Australian island territories. If illegal activity is detected the challenge 
remains to determine how to respond. The distances involved allow a poacher plenty 
of time to leave the area before an Australian Government ship can arrive.
Satellite Remote Sensing in Support of Defence and National Security
The use of space-based sensors by Defence and the wider national security 
community is difficult to discuss for the simple reason that there is little information 
on the public record from which to draw. The national security community does have 
privileged access to data from US intelligence-gathering satellites, however, quite 
severe constraints govern the release and use of this data beyond the intelligence 
community and a relatively small group of officials. These constraints can limit the 
usefulness of information gained from these sources. 
The 2009 Defence White Paper contained a paragraph, 9.80, which foreshadowed 
that Australia would acquire a SAR satellite at some point in the coming decade. 
As a significant new measure, the Government places a high priority on assured 
access to high-quality space-based imagery to meet Defence’s needs for mapping, 
charting, navigation and targeting data. It has decided to improve Australia’s 
intelligence collection capabilities by acquiring a satellite with a remote sensing 
capability, most likely to be based on a high-resolution, cloud-penetrating, synthetic 
aperture radar. This important capability will add to Australia’s standing as a 
contributing partner within our alliance framework with the United States, which will 
be given access to the imagery collected by this system.15
The importance of this paragraph should not be understated. It signalled that Australia 
was looking to strengthen its commitment to space-based remote sensing by doing 
more than processing data provided by others. Mention of a SAR sensor can be taken 
to imply that the Commonwealth was seeking to strengthen its understanding of the 
tropical regions to Australia’s north which are often covered by cloud. The projected 
satellite, especially if launched into an orbit around the Equator, would transit Australia’s 
northern approaches every 90-100 minutes or so and provide both cueing information 
and collateral to JORN and to Australian ships and aircraft operating in those areas.
Whether the 2015 Defence White Paper will pick up where the 2009 White Paper left 
off with regard to a sovereign Earth observation system from space remains to be 
seen. However, space from a security and operational perspective is emerging as an 
area likely to demand greater operational attention in the future; something more than 
a strategic element in Australia’s alliance relationship with the US as is the case today. 
There are clear implications for Australia’s understanding of its maritime domains of 
responsibility and interest. 
15 p82.
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Ships and other Surface Craft
Ships carry an array of sensors which are optimised for mission success. In the case 
of navy ships, success may be defined as self-protection and targeting. Commercial 
craft use different measures of success such as collision avoidance for a cargo ship 
and location of shoals of fish for a trawler. Most of these sensors are limited in range 
(basically to the horizon) although ship-borne aircraft and helicopters, manned and 
unmanned, have the capacity to extend that horizon. Data from individual ships can be 
fed into systems that permit cooperative targeting (eg. Ship A can fire a weapon at a 
target for which a firing solution has been provided by Ship B). This same data can be 
provided to the COP as either new information or confirmatory of information already 
in the system.
Ships also provide important ground truth for atmospheric and ocean environment 
measurements (temperature, air pressure, wind, current, salinity, etc.). These data are 
routinely fed into models and assist the BoM, for example, to produce more accurate 
weather predictions further into the future.
Submarines and Submersibles
Submarines carry an array of sensors which are optimised for mission success, 
defined broadly as self-protection and targeting. The range of organic submarine 
sensors, acoustic sensors in particular, is typically limited by water conditions 
(salinity, turbulence, ducting, temperature, ambient noise, 
etc.). Depending on the prevailing tactical situation a 
submarine that detects a target may not want to provide 
that information immediately to the COP for fear that 
transmission of the data may disclose its own presence to 
the target.
In the next 20 years robotic submersibles are likely to come 
into their own. Just what their impact will be on undersea 
operations of all types, including warfare, remains to be 
seen. Noting Australia’s commitment to acquiring a new fleet 
of capable conventionally powered submarines, a corollary 
should be the acquisition of knowledge about robotic 
submersibles – their signatures and capabilities – in order to 
inform the COP as it develops. 
Technical Databases and Signature Measurement and Management
A critical and sometimes overlooked or under-appreciated aspect of situational 
awareness in the tactical domain is the vital importance of technical databases. 
Radars for example may be readily identified as being of a particular type which 
can quickly be matched to a platform that typically carries that particular radar 
as standard fit. Most radars, however, have individual quirks which can permit that 
particular radar to be correlated with a particular ship. In a tactical situation the 
capacity to achieve hull-to-emitter correlation can provide information of great value. 
For example, in a conflict a submarine captain may be aware that two enemy ships of 
the same class and with the same type of radar are in her vicinity. She may also know 
that one of those ships has expended all of its torpedoes and has not re-provisioned 
whereas the other has not. If she can link the particular radar to one or other of the 
ships she gains an immediate advantage.
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Although the fine details of signatures of particular ships and aircraft may not be 
immediately available through the COP, they do need to be gathered, evaluated, 
stored and disseminated to relevant users. In the case of acoustic signatures, ships’ 
pumps are of particular interest because they emit distinctive signatures. The acoustic 
signatures of any given collection of pumps can allow not just a class of ship but the 
exact ship (by name or pennant number) to be identified.
The ADF has specialist units devoted to the collection, analysis, storage and 
dissemination, as needed, of this sort of information. Accurate and relevant signatures 
databases can be thought of as the crown jewels of situational awareness in the 
maritime domain because of the enormous tactical advantages they can confer. 
“Big” Data
In the past decade computer software has been invented which allows vast quantities 
of structured and unstructured data to be trawled for pieces of information that 
are innocuous if disconnected but can provide actionable intelligence if linked. For 
example, way bills, airline passenger manifests, movement of funds in and out of 
bank accounts, which in isolation are meaningless, together can point to, for example, 
preparations for an importation of drugs or other contraband. The important 
point from the perspective of situational awareness in the maritime domain is that 
more thorough exploitation of data already in the hands of authorities can lead to 
understanding without the need to task dedicated collection assets. 
An implication for capability developers and project officers is to ensure that a 
balance of investment is achieved across all facets of any ISR project. Sensors 
and the platform matter but so too do the supporting processing exploitation 
and dissemination systems. If these are not in place there is little point collecting 
information in the first place.
Dual Use Technology
The core technologies on which many of the systems described above depend are 
increasingly ‘dual use’ in nature. This means that they are not the exclusive preserve 
of the military or the broader national security community. The piece that becomes 
sensitive is not the ‘what’ of the system but rather the ‘how’, its use and application. 
The gap between systems designed for military use and their civilian and commercial 
equivalents is closing rapidly which means that the technological edge of the 1950s 
and 60s which gave western forces an edge over potential adversaries is eroding – 
quite quickly. 
Dual use technologies in Australia may be subject to export controls which, if invoked, 
immediately reduce the market potential for some Australian designed, developed 
and manufactured goods. There are follow-on impacts into the research and 
manufacturing sectors which, in turn, can adversely impact on stated objectives of 
self-reliance.
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The computers, including the hardware, firmware and software that sit at the heart 
of the COP are now, almost invariably, commercial products that are widely available 
anywhere in the world. Creating and maintaining advantage, based on differentiation 
of equipment is increasingly difficult to achieve. Increasingly, 
the edge is established in how equipment is used. This 
is about know-how and at the core of which are human 
interactions and behaviours that reflect culture, doctrine and 
training from which stem values including trust, discipline, 
loyalty, imagination and innovation. How these values are 
applied by decision makers working on a problem that is 
presented to them by the COP is increasingly the source of 
advantage at all levels of decision. 
How such knowledge is shared between nations, some with 
quite different cultures and practices for assessing and 
valuing information, is a problem of immediate and enduring 
concern. In this respect the COP is the beginning point for 
decision makers. It is certainly not the end point.
Conclusion
The main point of this chapter was to illustrate the range and diversity of information 
that is available today about Australia’s maritime domains. To the extent that this 
information is able to be collected, collated and displayed in ways that can be 
comprehended by many users, a COP can be said to exist. How the information is 
used is an entirely different matter and is largely beyond the capacity of the technical 
system to influence.
As noted at the start of this chapter, there is a series of investment balances to be 
struck between different systems, components of systems and organisations. The 
Australian Government has come a long way in the past decade in its appreciation of 
its maritime domains and their governance. In no small measure this is a result of more 
comprehensive and detailed understanding of the environment itself as well as the 
human activities that occur in, over, under and through it.
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DRAWING THE STRANDS TOGETHER
Few Australians have a clear and informed view of the vastness of Australia’s 
maritime domain, the diversity of the environments and the activities that occur within 
that domain. 
Maritime Domain Awareness is a beguilingly simple concept which embraces 
enormous complexity. This paper has sought to unpack this complexity and in doing 
so to explain the sorts of challenges faced by decision makers at all levels of activity. 
These challenges are magnified, or brought into even more stark relief in Australia 
because of its small population on the one hand and vast maritime areas for which it 
has some form of responsibility or interest on the other.
Until quite recently maritime threats to Australia and its interests were largely taken 
to mean foreign military forces with orders, intent and capacity to disrupt shipping 
to and from Australia, as occurred in both World Wars of the 20th Century. The 
21st century has added complexity. Globalisation of economies and supply chains, 
resource depletion, climate change, the emergence of influential non-state actors 
and the impact of ubiquitous information and communications technologies (ICT) are 
transforming relationships in and between nations.
Good governance of the world’s oceans is essential for the health of the planet as a 
whole, for the conduct of relations between nations and more generally to facilitate 
trade and commerce. Many Australians depend directly on the oceans for their 
livelihoods and many more have less apparent, but still important, dependencies. 
Many coastal towns and communities exist because of the tourists and holidaymakers 
who come to spend time at the beach. 
Over the past two decades, Australia has invested substantially in systems to 
improve the situational awareness about Australia’s maritime domains in a number 
of departments and agencies. Beyond the computing, display and associated 
technologies that enable the COP itself, there have been fundamental organisational 
and institutional reforms that have both enabled and compelled agencies to work 
more closely together, to coordinate activities and to share their information, their 
knowledge and their experience. The two stand-out examples are the creation of the 
Joint Operations Command (JOC) which is headquartered near Bungendore just 
outside of Canberra and the creation of the Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service (ACBPS) following the release of the nation’s first national security statement 
to the Parliament by Prime Minister Rudd in December 2008. 
The continued evolution of Australia’s border protection arrangements is welcomed, 
indicating that government is seeking to devise more effective ways of taking 
advantage of the internet and associated technologies whilst also becoming 
more efficient. In this regard the integration of the ACBPS into the Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection and the creation of an Australian Border Force 
seem to be logical steps.
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Six of the more important questions that arise when discussing situational 
awareness are:
•	 How much situational awareness is enough?
•	 What is the optimal balance of investment between systems that can assist 
decision makers to obtain situational awareness and other systems that can 
respond when needed?
•	 Are there certain capabilities that contribute to situational awareness that must 
remain in sovereign control and if so, what are they?
•	 How is situational awareness achieved across jurisdictional, organisational and 
other boundaries?
•	 What is the impact of technological development and how do capability developers 
decide about the mix of platforms and sensor types in which to invest? 
•	 What should be investment balance between platforms and sensors that collect 
information and the back-end systems that process, exploit and disseminate the 
results to decision-makers?
None of these questions is capable of being answered in isolation from any of the 
others. The potentials offered by new technologies are not being as well exploited 
as they might be because of the inherent caution that organisations apply when 
challenged, or forced, to embrace change. 
In the 1980s, the ICT revolution began to transform all human activities, including those 
concerned with maritime domain awareness. No longer is it sensible or sufficient to 
invest in platforms and sensors. Data processing, storage, retrieval and dissemination 
systems need to be capable of handling the data provided by sensors in order that 
best use can be made of the information that has been collected. This suggests that 
three further principles are now coming into play.
•	 Ensure that data, irrespective of source, is not left unprocessed and analysed for 
want of appropriate investment in backend systems.
•	 Where possible automate data flows, analysis and dissemination – save time, 
reduce errors and release staff for higher order tasks where judgement is essential.
•	 Minimise, to the extent possible, the amount of data in the system that is classified.
These additional considerations call for the development of a systems approach to 
maritime domain awareness that comprehends that each and every element of the 
system is, or may be, connected to every other element. The power of the system, 
including its resilience and redundancy is in the network. Sensors and platforms 
become nodes that both contribute to and take information from the network. 
This relatively simple concept is extraordinarily complex to implement. Legislative 
restrictions, organisational impediments and a plethora of competing and conflicting 
technical standards combine to make cooperation and coordination very hard. 
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In the past decade substantial progress has been made in creating a system that 
provides maritime domain awareness to Australian decision makers. Perhaps the 
most important outstanding task is for a narrative to be developed that explains the 
importance of the safety and security of Australia’s maritime domains to the nation’s 
broader national security interests and economic well-being. These matters have not 
been well-articulated to the broader public in a comprehensive and comprehendible 
way. Sectional interests, for obvious reasons, discuss marine parks, commercial 
shipping policy, and the need for new submarines and surface ships. Needed is a story 
that draws the strands together to show how they are linked and to provide context 
for investment decisions that must be made in the coming decade, some of which will 
have consequences well into the second half of the 21st century.
Against a rapidly changing region dominated by the rise of China, India and, closer 
to home, Indonesia, Australia’s approaches to understanding its maritime domains 
will be influenced by strategic factors and diplomatic judgements as well as 
operational imperatives. Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States and its 
relationships with regional neighbours may be expected to have a profound impact on 
the strength of the information sharing and interoperability regimes that on which so 
much of Australia’s maritime domain awareness depends.
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